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ABSTRACT
Previous findings have shown that intelligence test scores of members of disadvantaged
groups are negatively affected by their relative status in test situations. We explain this by
assuming that lower-status actors forego benefits that normally follow from successful
performance of a task if they anticipate that there are also costs associated with success.
We use an integration of Status Characteristics Theory, Rational Choice Theory, Prospect
Theory, and Self-Categorization Theory to argue that compared to high status
individuals, those of lower status should be particularly affected by costs associated with
high performance. We ran an experiment that manipulated factors such as perceived
social status and rewards/costs associated with intelligence test performance. We found
that low status individuals do, in fact, score lower than high status individuals when they
anticipate costs for high test performance. We further identified that the
underperformance was due to a conscious attempt to put forth less effort on the test. A
follow-up study assessed the extent to which the social status of the person giving the
sanctions contributes to this relationship. We found that low status individuals are
particularly affected by sanctions that their in-group give for high performances. We
discuss the implications of these findings in the context of educational inequality.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Intelligence test scores set off a domino effect of life outcomes for the test-taker. Those
with higher intelligence test scores tend to become more educated, get higher paying
jobs, and have more prestigious occupations (Collins 1979; Jencks et al.1972; Jencks et
al.1979; Hauser et al. 2000; Grodsky and Pager 2001; Hall and Farkas 2011). High
scorers are also more likely to contribute to society via productive economic behavior,
civic engagement, and a decreased rate of criminal activity (Nisbett 1998; Putnam 1995).
On the whole, higher intelligence test scores give individuals many of the pieces
necessary to have successful life outcomes.
And yet, the scores of entire categories of people are artificially decremented by
social processes. Those from a high socioeconomic background consistently outperform
those from more disadvantaged backgrounds on a variety of educational indictors (Blau
and Duncan 1967; Bordieu 1977; Hauser et al. 1983; Sewell et al. 1969). Racial
differences in test scores are also widely prevalent (Nisbett 1998). Given that intelligence
tests are highly consequential and that there are categorical differences in scores, we must
be certain that scores reflect a test-takers actual intellectual abilities and are not capturing
the remnants of some other process. However, differences in test scores are not solely due
to differences in academic abilities. Individuals are susceptible to the effects of social
processes, such as stereotype threat, socially motivated underachievement, and statusrelated bias (Steele and Aronson 1995; White et al. 2002; Lovaglia et al. 1998). As a
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result of these social impediments, many individuals score lower on intelligence tests
than their abilities warrant, and thus position themselves on a track to gain less
individually and contribute less collectively.
The fact that these social processes are at play, in general, is problematic.
However, the true danger lies in the fact that the same categories of people that tend to
score lower on intelligence tests are the ones that are differentially affected by the social
pressures to underachieve. On the whole, racial minorities and low-income students tend
to have more experiences that encourage them to underinvest in education, such as norms
of disengagement with school, peer-to-peer sanctioning for high achievement, and
familial dissuasion from long term educational goals (Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Fryer
and Torelli 2010; Austen-Smith and Fryer 2005). These experiences are unparalleled in
racial majority and high-income environments.
Taken together, these propositions not only showcase how easy it is for a
disadvantaged individual to remain fixed within a lower social class than their
intelligence warrants, but they also highlight a real societal level problem. As it stands,
we are doing little to address a major driving force behind social inequality that could
significantly improve mobility between classes. Taking measures to identify and
understand the negative consequences of the social processes behind underachievement is
the first step in rectifying this situation.
To help understand how social factors affect performance on mental ability tests,
this study draws on four literatures connected to the study of group processes: Status
Characteristics Theory, Rational Choice Theory, Prospect Theory, and SelfCategorization Theory. We use these theories to support an argument concerning the
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rewards/costs associated with performance on academic tests. We are interested in why
members of disadvantaged groups such as racial minorities and low-income students tend
to under-perform on such tests, even in situations where their actual abilities exceed those
of the majority group members.
We offer four main contributions here. First, we test the internal validity of the
argument that those of disadvantaged status score lower on intelligence tests than their
advantaged counterparts. Second, we disentangle the complex relationship between social
status and rewards/costs for high achievement to show that score decrements for low
status test-takers are affected by how socially and financially costly it will be to succeed.
Third, we identify the mechanism by which disadvantaged students underperform: by
way of a conscious decrease in effort. Fourth, we establish that there are particular
conditions that exacerbate socially motivated underachievement; namely, when costs for
success are implemented by an in-group member.
The studies that follow were designed to reflect the structural constraints that
differentially affect high and low status individuals. We took great care in creating
conditions that provide the strongest possible tests of our theoretically-derived
hypotheses but that also mirror real-world counterparts. Complex social processes are, by
nature, nuanced. We take advantage of the control afforded by experimental procedures
to highlight the sequence by which status, cost framing, and group membership affect
educational pursuits. While our contribution is to pinpoint the structural process that
individuals in these situations experience, our expectation is that researchers with other
methodological training and policy influence can use this research to similarly contribute

3

to the broader tapestry of understanding about how and why these social processes
contribute to those of disadvantaged status underperforming on tests.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The modern study of intelligence began with the idea that there is, at the same time, an
underlying general ability that permeates all cognitive tasks and specific abilities that are
unique to each cognitive task (Spearman 1927). The most widely accepted theory of
intelligence to date, the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, builds on this idea, delineating
intelligence into three hierarchically related stratum comprised of narrow, broad, and
general abilities (Cattell 1941; Horn 1965; Carroll 1993). General ability (g) is an
overarching cognitive ability that underlies a variety of other cognitive tasks. Fluid and
crystallized ability (g-f and g-c, respectively), are further subsets of broad abilities. Fluid
ability refers to the capacity to think logically, flexibly, and rapidly and to analyze and
identify patterns in novel situations, whereas crystalized ability is more of a general
collection of knowledge and vocabulary. These three abilities are the underlying
constructs that most tests of intelligence aim to measure.
By definition, tests of intelligence measure the capacity to understand complex
ideas, to adapt to the environment, to learn, to reason, to solve problems, and to overcome
obstacles by thinking about them (Neisser et al. 1996). Researchers assess mental ability
using psychometric measures, such as the Stanford-Binet, the Weschsler, and the Raven’s
Progressive Matrices (Terman and Merrill 1937; Wechsler 1939; Raven 1938). Each of
these tests employs distinct items and procedures. However, both correlations between
tests and factor analyses of subscales within tests indicate that all measure at least g, and
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sometimes also g-f and/or g-c (Gottfredson 1997). Scores on intelligence tests are
predictive of a range of related cognitive abilities and outcomes, such as school grades,
job performance, and even the likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior (Gottfredson
2004; Fischer et al. 1996). Intelligence test scores are considerably stable throughout the
lifespan with the largest deviations occurring in early childhood (Deary et al. 2000; Gow
et al. 2011). While evidence does indicate some generational instability in intelligence
scores, tests are re-normed approximately every ten years to account for this effect1
(Flynn 2007). This indicates that such psychometrics are both reliable and valid measures
of the construct of intelligence.
Despite that intelligence tests are some of the most psychometrically valid tests
ever created, there are still major critiques about what exactly they measure and how
differences in scores between groups highlight environmental influences on intelligence.
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) assert that intelligence tests’ major flaw is that they
conflate social and natural predictors. In other words, these tests do not delineate the
differences in intelligence that are caused by environmental factors versus genetic factors.
This distinction is important because of the fear that those who originate from groups that
have a lower average score will be seem as deterministicly low in intelligence, an
argument that Herrnstein and Murray make amid controversy. Understanding the

1

Dubbed the Flynn effect, raw intelligence test scores have increased by about 3 points every decade throughout

the 20th century (Flynn 1987). This has been attributed to everything from industrialization to advances in
mathematics instruction to more diversity in mating options to better nutrition (Daley et al. 2003; Mingroni 2004;
Lynn 1990).
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contribution of environment is important so as not to thwart efforts to intervene in
environmental processes that can decrement scores (Fischer et al. 1996).

Biological Influences on Intelligence
Researchers have assessed that biological influences on intelligence both directly,
through studies of the human genome, and indirectly, through heritability computations.
To date, no single gene for intelligence has been isolated2. Rather, genetic markers of
intelligence are widely distributed across many genes (Davies et al. 2011; Benyamin et
al. 2014; Plomin et al. 2001). Still, some contributing genes have yet to be identified and
the association of some seemingly known genes with intelligence have failed to replicate
in other study populations (Chabris et al. 2012). At this point, too little is known about
the complexities of the human genome for this area of research to contribute significantly
to the nature versus nurture debate, other than to acknowledge that a portion of the
variation in intelligence can be accounted for across a variety of genes.
While the direct study of the human genome is fairly recent, heritability studies
have been around for decades. In fact, the major underpinning of the biological nature of
intelligence stems from the fact that intelligence is one of the most heritable behavioral
traits (Deary et al. 2009). Heritability is the ratio of genetic variation to total variation in a
trait within a given population. Researchers usually test heritability using analyses of
twins that have been reared together or apart. Based on studies of identical twins raised in
separate environments, Bouchard et al. (1990) found that, despite different environments,
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It seems likely that no single gene will ever be identified. The dispersion of markers across many genes is

consistent with other complex traits, such as height (Yang et al. 2010).
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intelligence for separated twins was almost the same as that for non-separated twins. This
shows that, irrespective of environmental influences, intelligence is strongly genetically
related.
Such evidence is not as conclusive as it seems, however. Trait heritability, which
is measured at the group level, is often misattributed to be equivalent to individual level
genetic influence. In other words, it is not fair to say that since intelligence is highly
heritable, the source of each individual’s intelligence stems predominately from their
genetic make-up. In fact, heritability coefficients for intelligence differ across races,
socioeconomic statuses, and education levels. Advantaged groups, such as whites, those
with high incomes, and the well-educated, have higher heritability rates than
disadvantaged groups, such as blacks, those with low incomes, and the low-educated
(Scarr-Salapatek 1971; Turkheimer et al. 2003; Rowe et al. 1999). This lower heritability
means that there are environmental forces at large within these groups that do not allow
group members to cultivate their genetic potential for intelligence (Nisbett et al. 2012).
Furthermore, just as gene/environment interactions affect the expression of traits through
epigenetics, highly heritable traits can still be highly modifiable (Sternberg 2012).

Environmental Influences on Intelligence3
Schiff et al. (1978) found that children adopted from deprived homes into affluent homes
had higher intelligence than children who remained in deprived homes. In fact, the
socioeconomic status of an adoptive family significantly affects the intelligence score of
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Chapter 4 goes into considerably more detail about the social processes that affect intelligence test scores

and how they contribute to group differences in scores.
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children (Capron and Duyme 1989; Duyme et al. 1999). This shows that there is
something more than genetics that contributes to cognitive scores. The environment has
significant effects on intelligence as well. In fact, research shows that poor pre-natal
nutrition, exposure to lead, pre-natal exposure to alcohol, not being breast-fed, and
stressful events experienced in-utero are all related to lower mental ability test scores
(Pollitt et al. 1993; Needleman, Geiger and Frank 1985; Streisssguth, Barr and Sampson
1990; Mortensen et al. 2002; Eccleston 2011). These environmental influences are akin to
suppressing the genetic potential of individuals.

Group Differences in Intelligence Test Scores
The two major test score gaps occur racially and socioeconomically. On average, lowincome children score about 6 points lower than their high-income counterparts at age 2.
This gap almost triples by age 16 (Von Stumm and Plumin 2015). Not only do children
from disadvantaged family backgrounds have lower intelligence test scores than their
advantaged counterparts (Bradley & Corwyn 2002; Schoon et al. 2012; Strenze 2007),
but their test scores have been shown to worsen over time. This is in opposition to what
happens to advantaged children whose scores are more likely to increase with time
(Feinstein 2003). Along with test scores, socioeconomic status is strongly related to
overall academic achievement (White 1982).
Beyond the obvious advantages that wealth bestows upon children, high-income
families are also able to provide environments for their children that encourage
intellectual growth. Children of professional parents heard 10 million more words than
children of working class parents, providing them with a much richer vocabulary and an
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obvious advantage on intelligence tests (Hart and Risley 1995). Lareau (2003) shows that
parents of low socioeconomic status encourage obedience and respect for authority from
their children, whereas wealthy parents teach their children skills that grow their
intellectual curiosity. These attitudinal traits encourage upper-class children to pursue and
enjoy the educational process. Hart and Riley (1995) quantified this, showing that the
children of professional parents had a 6:1 encouragement to reprimand ratio, whereas
children of working class parents had a 2:1 ratio. By way of different attitudes towards
learning and schools, these patterns of socialization influence test scores, educational
attainment, and future occupational success.
Racial differences in test scores are also prevalent, with score differences between
blacks and whites often cited to be as large as 15 points (Neisser et al. 1996; Hernnstein
and Murray 1994). Some research exists that shows that these differences are innate and
due to genetic differences in behaviors, such as reaction times. However, such evidence is
controversial. For example, most people that are labeled as black in America have a
certain percentage of ancestry that would be labeled as white. Using this fact, Moore
(1986) showed that the eventual intelligence test score of black and mixed race adoptees
who had roughly equivalent intelligence test scores at age 8 was significantly affected by
the race of the their adoptive family. Additionally, racial differences in test scores often
do not take into consideration the institutionalized social policies that largely provide a
white privilege (Fischer et al. 1996).
Racial minorities and low-income families are also much more likely to live in
environments that have a negative effect on intelligence test scores. Black and lowincome children are more likely to be exposed to lead and less likely to be breastfed
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(Lanphear 2002; Forste et al. 2001; Mitra et al. 2004). Poverty-induced stress has been
shown to lower intelligence test scores by 13 points on average by reducing the amount
of mental bandwidth available to process information (Mani et al. 2013). Again, both
racial minorities and the socioeconomically disadvantaged as more likely to experience
these conditions, showcasing how these environmental discrepancies between groups can
increase test score gaps.
While research supports the conclusion that both innate and environmental factors
affect mental ability, individuals cannot significantly alter their genetic predispositions.
Environments can be altered, however, and there is still much to learn about the effects of
environmental factors on mental ability. Given that differences have been observed
between individuals under differing social conditions, it is worth uncovering the
mechanisms responsible for such findings.
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CHAPTER 3
CONSEQUENCES OF INTELLIGENCE TEST SCORES
Those who use test scores to make decisions about the life of another person are much
less concerned with how someone arrived at their score (through genetic giftedness or a
superior environment) than they are with the actual score. In terms of practical
implications, the theoretical concept of intelligence is replaced entirely by its measurable
counterpart. Intelligence is the score that one receives on the test (Scarr 1997). And the
consequences of the score are tremendous, touching all aspects of life, including
educational attainment, occupational prestige, salary, and productive citizenship.

Intelligence Tests and Schooling
There is a positive association between intelligence test score and eventual level of
education attained. Those with higher intelligence test scores tend to reach a higher level
of education (Griliches and Mason 1972; Jencks et al. 1979; Hauser et al. 1983; Sewell et
al. 1969). This relationship remains even after controlling for parent’s level of education
and other socioeconomic factors that are linked with educational attainment. One
explanation of the higher educational attainment by those of high cognitive ability is the
strong relationship between intelligence test score and academic achievement. Direct
correlations tend to range from .40 to .50, with McGrew and Knopik (1993) even
reporting a median correlation as high as .76. It is not surprising that those who do better
at school stay in it for a longer amount of time.
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In addition to test scores contributing significantly to eventual education level,
school officials overtly use test scores to make decisions about educational settings for
students. Administrators reserve placement into gifted and talented programs for students
who have scores that exceed certain standards (usually above the 97th percentile of testtakers). Remedial services are also restricted based on test scores to students who have
scores that are low enough to indicate a need for special education. School officials also
use tests scores to track some students away from academics entirely, instead
encouraging vocational courses. While the placement of students into these vocational
categories is much more prevalent internationally, the practice does also occur
domestically (Hanushek and Woessmann 2006). In all of these cases, access to school
services are heavily, if not entirely, dependent on test scores such that these test scores
quite literally determine the occupational path of the student.
Intelligence test scores also have major implications within the general student
population. The practice of tracking, which occurs when schools group students into
classrooms that are based on ability level. This type of sorting puts some students on a
track where they receive a differentiated and enhanced educational experience from those
who are tracked to a lower level. All students learn the same material, however, those
with certain scores learn together. Students in higher ability tracks experience norms of
engagement with the course material and high-quality teaching, all of which contribute to
an ease of information retention and a culture of enthusiasm that is not present in lower
tracks (Jennings et al. 2015; Barr and Dreeben 1983; Gamoran and Mare 1989; Lucas
2001; Oakes 1985).
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The consequences of such tracking compound over the years. Imagine two
students who are roughly equivalent, but separated by a point on an intelligence test. One
student gets placed on the upper track and one on the lower. At first, this distinction
seems arbitrary. However, by the end of schooling, the higher tracked student has
actually outperformed the lower tracked student. Many factors are at play here. Higher
tracked students are selected for their intelligence, then separated into isolated groups,
and then given specialized training that is not available to other students. The placement
of a student onto this higher track can be seen as a stamp of approval and confidence
from school officials and can serve as somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Brophy
1983). Conversely so, for a lower tracked student.
If all else were equal, we might chalk this up to the existence of seemingly
arbitrary, but procedurally necessary, cut-offs for school services. However, certain
groups of people tend to end up on certain tracks. Low-income students are not nearly as
prevalent in higher tracks as the wealthy (Gameran and Mare 1989). While, in theory,
ability grouping and tracking allow schools to tailor educational experiences to their
student population, in practice, they contribute heavily to educational inequality
(Gamoran and Mare 1989; Lucas 1999; Oakes 1985). Scholars have likened tracking to
re-segregation because of the additive effects that it can have on racial minorities (Zirkel
and Cantor 2004).

Intelligence Tests and Occupations
Those who have higher intelligence test score tend to have more prestigious occupations.
Gottfredson (1997) shows that the minimum threshold for an intelligence test score

14

increases with job prestige with the highest and lowest categories of occupations being
separated by two standard deviations in median scores. This occurs through a number of
different cognitively and environmentally-based routes. But even net of socioeconomic
status and race, cognitive abilities remain integrally related to occupational prestige
(Kerckhoff et al. 2001).
Hiring committees that select for these prestigious occupations may favor those of
higher intelligence because intelligence predicts job performance in more or less all
occupations (Hartigan and Wigdor 1989). In fact, as job complexity increases, the
predictive validity of intelligence increases along with it (Hunter 1983; 1986). Those with
higher intelligence could also be more in demand for jobs because they are easily
trainable, owning to their ability to acquire skills independently and complete tasks
without close supervision (Gottfredson 1997; Hunter and Schmidt 1996). Relatedly,
cognitive ability is also associated with greater work productivity (Hauser et al. 2000)
As cognitive skills are strongly associated with both job performance and
productivity, it follows that intelligent workers are highly rewarded by their employers
(Jensen 1969). In fact, those with higher cognitive test scores tend to have much higher
salaries than those with lower test scores. Again, group differences in occupational
prestige and wages are prevalent. In fact, differences in intelligence tests scores explain a
large portion (nearly half) of the racial wage gap (O’Neill 1990; Farkas and Vicknair
1996; Neal and Johnson 1996). Some attribute this difference, not to intelligence test
scores alone, but to their effect on level of education received (Bowles and Gintis 2002).
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Intelligence Tests and Community Contributions
Those who have higher test scores are more civically engaged. They tend to participate
more in community-oriented activities, such as voting and taking part in rallies and other
political demonstrations. They are more likely to sign petitions and to profess a greater
interest in politics, in general (Deary 2008). In fact, Hernnstein and Murray (1994) go as
far as to equate high intelligence with more civility and better citizenship. High scorers
tend to use their money in a way that benefits others, such as investing. Intelligence test
scores are also predictive of involvement in criminal behaviors with those of lower
intelligence being more criminally active (Herrnstein and Murray 1994).
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CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL PROCESSES THAT AFFECT TEST SCORES
Given the high stakes of test scores, it is crucial that test performance reflects an
individual’s actual abilities. However, previous research has shown that there are
systematic differences in mental ability test scores that are not accounted for by
differences in mental ability. Social processes, such as stereotype threat, socially
motivated underachievement, and status-related bias alter an individual’s test score away
from their true score value, leading to decrements in scores for only certain categories of
people (Steele and Aronson 1995; White et al. 2002; Lovaglia et al. 1998). These
categories of people, namely, minorities and those of low-income, are disproportionally
affected. Thus, understanding these processes could be key to lessening the achievement
gaps discussed earlier.

Stereotype Threat
In general, test anxiety mediates the relationship between ability and test performance
(Hembree 1988). Factors linked to test anxiety, such as stereotype threat, also can bias
test performance so that it does not accurately reflect ability. Stereotype threat occurs in
situations where there is pressure to avoid confirming a negative stereotype about one’s
group (Steele and Aronson 1995). For example, when told that people generally believe
their group lacks high mental ability, black students performed worse on a test than when
they were not primed with such a stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson 1995). Similar
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effects have been found with those of lower socioeconomic status and disadvantaged
racial categories (Croizet and Claire 1998; Desert et al. 2009; Aronson and Salinas 1997).
Stereotype threat not only impacts performance on tests, it also causes students to
self-handicap in other ways, such as by decreasing their time spent practicing for tasks
and by valuing the task, in general, less (Stone 2002; Aronson et al. 2002; Osborne 1995;
Steele 1997). While any individual that fears confirming a negative stereotype about their
group can be susceptible to stereotype threat, those who identify strongly with the
stereotyped group tend to be the most affected (Ployhart et al. 2003; Schmader 2002).
Explanations of why stereotype threat occurs tend to revolve around anxiety, but
numerous other mechanisms have been noted, such as, but not limited to, reduced effort,
physiological arousal, and a loss of motivation (Stone 2002; Osborne 2006; 2007;
Schimel et al. 2004; Cadinu et al. 2005). Interventions have been successful in reducing
instances of stereotype threat (Good et al. 2008; McGlone and Aronson 2006; Cohen et
al. 1999). However, stereotype threat cannot account for all of the findings that our
theory predicts, such as those involving non-stereotyped social characteristics.

Socially Motivated Underachievement
Along with test anxiety, performance has been known to suffer because of socially
motivated underachievement. This occurs when individuals purposefully underachieve
out of concern for others, to maintain relationships or to manage their social reputation
(White et al. 2002). This differs from performance decrements due to social factors, such
as stereotype threat, because individuals consciously choose to put forth less effort on
academic endeavors. Socially motivated underachievers perceive high academic
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performance in direct opposition to social acceptance (Fordham and Ogbu 1986, Fryer
and Torelli 2004, Austin-Smith and Fryer 2005). If the norms of a social group
discourage educational pursuits and social acceptance is a high priority for a student, then
the academic performance of that student might not reflect their true intelligence.

The Burden of Acting White
The exploration of socially motivated underachievement started with Fordham and
Ogbu’s concept of the Burden of Acting White. This burden is activated when, to avoid
being labeled as white, academically-capable black students purposefully underachieve.
In the context of education, “acting white” means: spending time in the library studying,
getting good grades in school, working hard at school, and speaking standard English
(Fordham and Ogbu 1986). To avoid garnering this label, academically-capable black
students might withholding efforts to achieve, opt out of selective courses and higher
level tracks, and put more emphasis on sports-related talents than academic-related
talents. This is particularly true when one’s racial identity is high because the sanctions
related to breaking social norms are much more costly to one who identifies more
strongly with their group.
Empirical tests of the Burden of Acting White report contradictory evidence,
however. While most studies can agree that blacks have experienced accusations of
“acting white” from same-race peers (Datnow and Cooper 1997; Ferguson 2001), these
accusations have not always been tied to academic performances (Bergin and Cook
2002). Additionally, black high achievers do not report lowering their educational
aspirations or achievement because of accusations of “acting white” (Bergin and Cooks
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2002; Datnow and Cooper 1997). Peer sanctioning for above-average performances are
reportedly not widely prevalent and the social penalties that high achievers do receive are
no greater for blacks than for whites (Bergin and Cooks 2002; Ainsworth-Darnell and
Downey 1998; Cook and Ludwig 1997).
However, in support of Fordham and Ogbu’s theory, Fryer and Torelli (2010)
found that for blacks, as grades increase, popularity increases until a student reaches a
high level of achievement (which they defined as a 3.5 grade point average). This
relationship is particularly strong when considering data from a public rather than a
private school and when the school’s population is less than 20% black. Importantly, the
relationship does not hold if students have a high socioeconomic status or if they attend
private school. This shows the need for theoretical advancements, such as precise scope
conditions, and methodological improvements, such as the use of experimental methods,
in examining socially motivated underachievement.

Two-Audience Signaling Model
The Two-Audience Signaling model contributes significant theoretical advancements for
socially motivated underachievement (Austen-Smith and Fryer 2005). Rather than
concentrating solely on finding racialized performance decrements in school settings, it
pinpoints the conditions under which underperformance might occur and those that are
most susceptible to it. In this way, empirical tests can be more targeted towards the
correct population.
The Two-Audience Signaling model proposes that blacks are pressured by two
distinct audiences: the social audience and the economic audience. From the social
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audience, they receive same-race peer pressure to conform to group norms, whereas,
from the economic audience, they receive pressure to achieve academically so that they
can ultimately increase their socioeconomic status. Individuals cannot succumb to the
pressures of both audiences and are forced to choose which audience to impress.
Essentially, they are deciding if they would prefer to be accepted by their peers or
accepted to college.
The extent to which an individual values group acceptance relative to eventual
income is the most important factor in determining who will succumb to socially
motivated underachievement. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) present a typology of high
and low social and economic types to showcase this. High social types, those that value
group acceptance, fear peer group rejection more than low social types and are thus more
susceptible to peer group norms of underinvesting in education. Low economic types
expect to earn low wages regardless of their achievement. Rather than have both small
wages and peer group rejection, low economic types purposefully underachieve as a
method of ensuring their place amongst their group.

Experimental Tests of Socially Motivated Underachievement
In addition to the theoretical improvements described above, socially motivated
underachievement has benefited from numerous experimental tests in the domain of
psychological social psychology. Studies show that high performers experience
emotional distress and are fearful of rejection and group sanctions (Exline and Lobel
1999; 2001). In reaction to knowingly outperforming others, participants avoid those that
they outperformed and/or underperform themselves in order to fit in with group norms
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(Exline et al. 2013; White et al. 2002). A fear of outperforming others also encourages
students to prefer private, rather than public, recognition of their achievements (Exline et
al. 2004). While these studies make only passing allusions to applications in racially and
socio-economically driven socially motivated underachievement, they point to a very
similar process.

Status and Test Scores
Most relevantly to the study at hand, Lovaglia et al. (1998) demonstrated that social
status impacts mental ability test scores. Within a given culture, those who possess
qualities that are considered to be low status (e.g., racial and ethnic minorities) do worse
on tests than those who possess high status qualities. This stems from a process by which
those of low status expected lower rewards and higher costs for high achievement than
did their high status counterparts.
These expected consequences are paramount to understanding status-related score
decrements. For example, stereotype threat asserts that students expect to receive
sanctions for scoring low on a test. This low score would, in turn, confirm negative
stereotypes about their group. Status-related bias, on the other hand, affects those who
expect sanctions for scoring too high. This high score would signal norm violations to
their group (Lovaglia et al. 2004). It may be the case, however, that costs for scoring too
low via stereotype threat are perceived as costs from an out-group, whereas costs for
scoring too high via status-related bias are viewed as coming from in-group members. In
this way, the source of the sanctions might help to discriminate between stereotype threat
and status-related score decrements.
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Building on these studies concerning status-related bias, we draw on Status
Characteristics Theory (SCT) for our arguments concerning mental ability testing. While
SCT is typically concerned with collective tasks involving two or more interactants, an
extension of SCT states that individual performance will also be a function of status
processes if individual performance is used to determine future status (Lovaglia and
Lucas 1997). Although Lovaglia et al. (1998) demonstrated that status processes affect
test scores, there have been few follow-up studies for almost two decades.
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CHAPTER 5
THEORY
Status Characteristics Theory
Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) links the social roles and expectations from larger
society to stratification processes in small groups. Through a series of logically
interrelated assumptions, precise term definitions, and scope conditions, SCT connects
these culturally specific beliefs to group members’ expectations of task performance for
both themselves and others. These expectations, in turn, influence the actual performance
of the members of the group. In this way, SCT makes predictions about how members of
groups will become stratified and who will have the most influence over group decisions.
SCT is part of a larger body of work on expectation states, with research evidence that
dates back approximately 55 years (Berger 1958).
SCT rests on the idea that there are two kinds of characteristics that group
members find integral to tasks. Specific status characteristics are characteristics that
create expectations for performance in limited settings. Examples include specific
abilities like basketball skills or mathematical expertise. If a group gets together to solve
a calculus problem, it would make sense that they might base their expectations for
performance on a specific status characteristic, such as mathematical ability. However,
group members also base their opinions of others on characteristics that are not actually
related to the task. Such characteristics, called diffuse status characteristics, create
expectations for performance in diverse situations. Examples include race, gender,
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education level, physical attractiveness, and age (Cohen and Roper 1972; Webster and
Driskell 1978; Foschi 1996; Pugh and Wahrman 1983; Wagner, Ford, and Ford 1986;
Walker et al. 1996). Both the specific and diffuse status characteristics that each group
member possesses aggregate to form overall performance expectations that contribute to
a group member’s place in the group’s status hierarchy. These hierarchies are
unconsciously formed, collectively agreed upon, and result in high and low status group
members (Berger et al. 1977). Costs and benefits are bestowed upon group members
according to their relative status in this hierarchy. Those of high status tend to participate
more in groups, be more positively evaluated by other group members, are more likely to
be elected as group leaders, and have, overall, more influence of the group’s eventual
decisions. Those of low status participate less in group tasks, have their suggestions more
negatively evaluated by other group members and tend to have less influence over their
fellow group members (Berger 1958; Berger and Connor 1974).
The predictions that SCT makes apply only in particular situations. The following
scope conditions outline such instances (Berger et al. 1977). There must be at least two
individuals working together on a task that can be evaluated in terms of success or
failure. The individuals must be motivated towards successful task completion and
believe that there are some individuals that possess a characteristic that is instrumental to
completing the task, while there are others who do not. The task must also be completed
collectively amongst group members. Many groups fall within these scope conditions,
such as hiring committees, juries, and classroom workgroups.
The earliest research on the impact of status characteristics showed that both high
status and low status actors evaluate the contributions of high status actors more
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positively than the contributions of low status actors (Berger et al. 1977). Subsequent
research further showed that status effects persist across interaction settings (Pugh and
Wahrman 1983; Markovsky et al 1984). From SCT and its associated Reward
Expectations Theory (Berger et al. 1998), we also know that status processes generate
social structures wherein rewards are inferred based upon status. However, we suggest
that low status actors also may anticipate costs associated with high performance if such
performance would conflict with the status structure. Assuming no actual status-based
differences in ability, if low status actors anticipate higher costs for high performance,
then it is in their best interest to underachieve. In this way, performing lower than their
actual ability spares them from receiving penalties.
In order to apply SCT in this way, there must be shared expectations that low
status actors have lower ability and, more than for high status actors, that high
performance will be costly for those lower in status. The anticipated consequences of
high test performance thus explain the differences in test scores amongst high and low
status actors. These consequences include expectations on the part of low status actors
that they will be penalized for high performance, with no such expectation held by high
status actors (Lovaglia et al. 1998). SCT treats different status characteristics as having
identical consequences for interaction. Characteristics that have been shown to produce
expectations for competence, regardless of actual competence, include age, race, gender,
education level and physical attractiveness. Whether treating African-Americans as lower
status than Caucasians (Cohen and Roper 1972; Webster and Driskell 1978), or females
as lower status than males (Foschi 1996; Pugh and Wahrman 1983; Wagner, Ford, and
Ford 1986; Walker et al. 1996), the higher the “state” of the characteristic one possesses,
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the more influence one is assumed to have in task-relevant interactions. Therefore, if low
status actors tend to do worse on mental ability tests than high status actors, this effect
should present itself both in terms of race in mixed-race settings, and gender in mixedgender interactions.
The mental ability test effect does not occur in mixed-gender interactions,
however. On average, females do as well as males on such tests (Jensen 1998; Stumpf
and Stanley 1996). Still, differences in scores do appear along racial lines. On average,
African-Americans do worse than Caucasians on such tests (Jensen 1998; Herrnstein and
Murray 1994). For these reasons, there must be a mechanism other than status that affects
test performance. Earlier we conflated rewards and costs when discussing anticipated
consequences of mental ability test performance. As we discuss below, however, there is
strong evidence that people do not treat rewards and costs symmetrically: the motivation
to avoid costs is stronger than the motivation to seek comparable rewards. We propose
that one reason intelligence test scores differ across racial lines but not across gender
lines is that females expect lower rewards than males for scoring high on mental ability
tests, while African-Americans expect higher costs than Caucasians for scoring high on
mental ability tests. In this way, the perception of rewards and costs in low status actors is
one of the mechanisms responsible for lower test scores.

Rational Choice Theory and Prospect Theory
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) holds that individuals assess their options and make
choices based on the expected benefits and costs of these decisions (Homans 1961). RCT
makes the follow assumptions about individual behavior. All choices can be rank ordered
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in terms of preference (completeness) and all choices can be compared to other choices
(transitivity). Additionally, alternative choices that are not within the choice set would
not encourage a re-ordering of the choices that are within the current choice set
(independence of irrelevant alternatives). While individuals do seek to maximize the
utility of their choices, they only act as if they are aware of and can calculate the benefits
and costs of each alternative.
Within this framework actors make decisions based on rewards and costs,
preferring large rewards to small rewards, and small costs to large costs (Simon 1955).
Status characteristics also have been shown to generate reward expectations consistent
with status levels (e.g., Harrod 1980). It follows that, because rewards and costs are
strongly correlated with status, those with low status expect smaller rewards and/or larger
costs. However, as stated above, perceptions of rewards and costs may differ across status
characteristics. Actors in the low state of some status characteristics may associate
smaller rewards with high performance on mental ability tests, while actors in the low
state of other status characteristics may associate larger costs with high performance on
the same tests.
SCT assumes that states of status characteristics receive their differential
evaluations from the broader culture within which the focal group interaction transpires.
It thus seems plausible to consider the possibility that the broader culture may also
emphasize the advantages rather than the disadvantages of certain status characteristics,
and the disadvantages rather than the advantages of others. Our purpose in this research,
however, is not to identify the source of these distinctions if they do in fact exist, but
rather to test for their effects.
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According to Prospect Theory (PT), these differing perceptions would affect
choice behavior: all else equal, actors are more likely to engage in behavior to avoid costs
than to acquire rewards (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
PT, which was developed as an alternative model to RCT, asserts that there are two
stages that individuals use to evaluate choices. Similar to RCT, options are first ordered
in relation to preference. However, individuals then act as if they are setting a reference
point with which to compare all of the options. In relation to this reference point,
anything higher is seen as a benefit, whereas anything lower is viewed as a cost. In this
way, PT differs from RCT in that it is more concerned with relative, rather than absolute,
gains and losses. This sensitivity to potential losses may explain the difference between
the test scores of low status actors that perceive high costs associated with high
performance vs. low status actors that perceive lower rewards associated with high
performance.

Self-categorization Theory
The in-group/out-group status of the source of these rewards and costs may be equally as
important to this process. Just as individuals do not perceive rewards and costs
symmetrically, they do not regard the source of these rewards and costs as equal either. A
cost for high achievement may loom larger, if it comes from an in-group member. Selfcategorization theory (ST) details how this process occurs (Turner 1985; Turner et al.
1987). Individuals view their connections to groups in terms of shared social categories.
These categories become pervasive to their own identity such that they experience a
process of depersonalization. Depersonalization occurs when group members perceive
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themselves as interchangeable members of the group that possess prototypical features of
the group (Turner 1985). Such prototypically involves agreement with and portrayal of
the beliefs, opinions, goals, and norms of the group. Consensus with in-group members
generates positive feelings, whereas disagreement with in-group members generates
uncertainty (David and Turner 1996, 2001). Identity processes other than ST have also
been noted to contribute to score decrements. When student that they are taking a test that
confirms their identity, they do much better than when they think that success on the test
will confirm a contrasting identity (Youngreen et al. 2004).
The Burden of Acting White, discussed earlier, provides an excellent explanatory
vehicle for how achievement is affected by identity processes (Fordham and Ogbu 1986).
Using this example, we assume that a group norm is to dis-identify from educational
pursuits. If a black student engages in a behavior that violates the norms of a group, such
as participating frequently in class or always completing homework assignments, then
they are acting in direct opposition to their group. Rather than blending into the group via
depersonalization and prototypicality, they are instead marking themselves as an outsider.
In this example, the cost of violating the group norm is essentially ostracism from the
group with the label of “acting white”. Depending on how much a student identifies with
their group, this cost could be enough to deter them from high scholastic achievement.

Formal Theory
According to PT, actors should be more affected by the threat of costs than to the chance
of rewards. ST implies that individuals will also be more sensitive to costs, if they
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originate from their in-group, rather than their out-group. This leads to Propositions 1 and
2:

P1: All else being equal, an actor will seek to avoid costs rather than obtain rewards.
P2: All else being equal, an actor will seek to avoid costs from their in-group more than
costs from their out-group.

Lovaglia et al. (1998) found that low status actors scored lower than high status
actors on a measure of mental ability. However rewards and costs were confounded in
that research. Our research teases apart their effects by determining whether low status
actors respond differently to the prospect of gaining smaller rewards for high scores, or
incurring higher costs for high scores. The following sections use gender and race to
illustrate this argument in more concrete terms.

Low Rewards for High Performance
Traditionally, females can expect lower rewards for high performance than males. When
females hold high status positions such as lawyer, professor, engineer, physician or
business executive, their average salary is significantly less than the average male’s
salary (Katz and Murphy 1992; Blau and Kahn 1994; Wood et. al 1993; Biddle and
Hamermesh 1998; Barbezat 1987; Gander 1997; Morgan 1998; Bertran and Hallock
2001). Similarly, although women receive equal opportunities for promotion, they are
held to higher standards of performance (Olson and Becker 1983). Furthermore, when
females are promoted, they receive a smaller salary increase than males (Gerhart and
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Milkovich 1989) and are accorded less prestige (Tyree and Hicks 1988). This leads to
Proposition 2a:

P2a: Lower status actors will expect lower rewards for high performance than higher
status actors.

High Costs Associated with High Performance
Traditionally, African-Americans can expect higher costs for high performance than
Caucasians. Research shows that minority students who do well on tests can expect to be
socially shunned by their peers for trying to “act white” (Fordham and Ogbu 1986;
Steinberg, Dornbusch and Brown 1992). African-Americans that portray academic
achievement in a positive light are more likely to be depressed and concerned about
social approval (Arroyo and Zigler 1995). Additionally, African-Americans who attempt
to complete a college degree report high personal and emotional costs. The social costs
may be so high that they come to expect that the degree will not improve their lives
(Steele 1992).
African-Americans can also expect to be penalized for their mental ability if it
exceeds the expectations of teachers. This “Pygmalion Effect” occurs when AfricanAmericans with high IQ scores are criticized more and praised less than both Caucasians
with high and low IQ scores and African- Americans with low IQ scores (Rosenthal and
Jacobson 1968; Rubovites and Maehr 1973). For these reasons, African-Americans can
expect to incur costs for scoring higher than expected on mental ability tests from both
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their in-group (their peers) and their out-group (their teachers). This leads to the
following propositions:

P2b: Lower status actors will expect higher costs for high performance than higher status
actors.
P3a: Low status actors will expect high costs from in-group members for high
performance.
P3b: Low status actors will expect high costs from out-group members for high
performance.

Low Rewards vs. High Costs
If the salient message to African-Americans is “keep your head down and do not stand
out” and the salient message to females is “work twice as hard to get half as far,” then
this would be reflected in the perceptions of rewards and costs associated with high
performance. For this reason, we will test for the effects of rewards and costs on low
status actors as related to their scores on mental ability tests. The following derivation
(D) obtains from the foregoing propositions:

D1: All else being equal, if an actor is low in status and expects lower rewards and higher
costs for high performance, s/he will seek to avoid costs rather than to obtain rewards.
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In-Group Costs vs. Out-Group Costs
If a group member identifies with their group, then they will place more emphasis on the
opinions of fellow group members than outsiders. In-group sanctioning for high
achievement, therefore, would serve as more of a deterrent for high performance than
out-group sanctioning. We derive the following from the foregoing theoretical discussion
on group identification processes:

D2: All else being equal, if an actor expects high costs from an in-group member, they
will seek to avoid these costs more than if these costs come from an out-group member.

Thus, in addition to potentially replicating Lovaglia and colleagues’ important findings,
our research teases out the potentially separate effects that perceived social rewards and
social costs may have on intelligence test performance and makes predictions about when
this process is more likely to occur; that is, in the presence of in-group sanctions.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY ONE: METHODS
We instantiated the above theoretical derivations and conducted two experiments that
were designed to isolate the effects of status, costs/rewards for high achievement, and
group membership on test scores. As detailed below, Study One examines how status and
cost/reward framing intersect to cause score decrements in test-takers. Study Two extends
Study One by looking at the relationship between in-group/out-group memberships of the
person who makes achievement costly and test scores. Throughout the design of these
studies, we relied on well-tried methods and measures. However, when necessary, we
pre-tested novel experimental manipulations and different versions of the dependent
variable. Appendix A fully details these tests.

General Procedures
Upon arrival at the lab, each subject was met by a project assistant and escorted to a small
room with a desk, keyboard and computer monitor. Before proceeding, the subject was
asked to read and sign an informed consent form. The assistant then initiated a program
on the subject’s computer4. After a brief introduction to the study, the computer

4

Authorware was used to program the subject interface, present information and gather responses. Along

with programming done b the authors, we used programs and scripts designed by Will Kalkhoff and
Michael Lovaglia.
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administered a questionnaire requesting information on age, gender, college and high
school GPA, SAT scores, mother’s and father’s occupation and education history, and an
estimate of how many books were in their house as a child. This was also used by
Lovaglia et al. (1998), with the measured factors serving as potential control variables in
statistical analyses. Following the collection of demographic and control variable
information, subjects were told that they would take a test that would influence which
pay grade would determine their compensation for the study. They were told that their
pay would be based on both their ostensible status as right or left-handed (see below) and
their performance on the test. All the while, instructions and pay grades were presented
with language that sounded rewarding or costly. This constituted the framing
manipulation.
After completing the test, each subject was interviewed by a trained lab assistant.
The purpose of the interview was to ensure that the subject was fully engaged in the
study, understood all instructions, and had no suspicions with respect to manipulations or
deceptions. Following the interview, the subject was debriefed as to the overall purpose
of the research, the hypotheses being tested, and his or her experimental condition. The
nature and purpose of the deceptions were also explained in the debriefing, and the
assistant offered repeated opportunities to ask questions and seek clarifications. The
assistant asked the subject for a verbal commitment to not share any details of the
research with other students, as this would eliminate others’ chances of participating.
Before leaving, the subject was paid in cash for his or her time, thanked by the assistant,
and escorted to the exit door.
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Design
We used a 2 (Status: High, Low) x 2 (Framing: Rewards, Costs) factorial design. The
Status factor accounted for whether participants were made to believe that their
handedness would either help (High Status) or hinder (Low Status) their effort at the
group task, while the Framing factor was based on whether pay for the study was framed
in terms of gains (Reward) or losses (Cost).

Independent Variable: Status Manipulation
Rather than relying on naturally occurring status differences among subjects, we
capitalized on the laboratory setting by controlling perceived status differences. When
testing for status effects, we can differentiate subjects by one clearly defined taskrelevant status characteristic. This experiment employed a status manipulation phase in
which participants believed they possessed either the high or low state of a status
characteristic. This was accomplished as follows. The computer program asked the
subjects to identify as either right or left-handed (in reality, the study was given
exclusively to right-handed subjects for the simplicity of programming and initiating only
one subject interface). Subjects were then informed that in the upcoming half of the study
they will be working on a difficult task requiring group members to work together in
order to complete it successfully. They were told that ability at this task is strongly
related to handedness. In fact, there was no group interaction as we were only interested
in the impact of the status assignment on performance at the mental ability test to follow.
Using the same method as Lovaglia et al. (1998), we provided several rationales to
associate either the subjects’ non-dominant hand with traits related to the successful
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completion of the task, and his/her dominant hand with traits related to unsuccessful task
outcomes or vice versa depending on the status condition (see Appendix B). For example,
to make a participant think that left-handers were higher in status, they would be told that
left-handers were much better at coordinating group work, getting things done in groups,
and leading groups. They would also be told that right-handers, in contrast, were too
inflexible, made poor decisions, and were so rigid that they could not lead a group
effectively. Therefore, based on handedness, subjects were either assigned to the low
status or high status position. Methods of establishing status based on seemingly arbitrary
characteristics have been used successfully in much prior research (Jemmott and
Gonzalez 1989). Mild deceptions such as these are extremely common in experimental
research on status. In every case, they are identified in a debriefing at the end of the study
and their purpose explained thoroughly to subjects.

Independent Variable: Framing Factor
Subjects were informed of a series of pay categories associated with performance on a
fictional work aptitude test. They were given information showing salaries for the
ostensible upcoming group task that ranged from $10-$38, and whether a low or high
status actor (in terms of handedness) could obtain this salary.
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Table 6.1. Reward Framing Manipulation.
Job
Status
Aptitude
LeftSuperior
Psychotherapist
handed

Pay
$38

Status

Aptitude

Lefthanded

Moderate

Technician

$13.50

Righthanded

Superior

Lefthanded

Poor

Orderly

$10.00

Righthanded

Moderate,
Poor

Table 6.1 shows the framing manipulation for a low status subject whose study
was framed in terms of rewards. As the table shows, rewards for doing well on the test
were not as high as if that subject were of high status. It is impossible for them to obtain a
job paying higher than $13.50. However, a high status subject could earn up to $38.00.
All subjects were also told that high scoring high status subjects would receive
recognition from the career center for their outstanding performance and that this kind of
recognition is useful for obtaining jobs after college. Low status high scoring subjects, on
the other hand, would simply receive a pamphlet detailing the resources available at the
career center. These manipulations were intended to reflect the different outcomes for
high and low status individuals in terms of high and low rewards.

Table 6.2. Cost Framing Manipulation.
Status
Aptitude
Job
Lefthanded

Superior

Psychotherapist

Pay
Cut
-$0

Lefthanded

Moderate

Technician

-$24.50

$13.50

Righthanded

Superior

Lefthanded

Poor

Orderly

-$28.00

$10.00

Righthanded

Moderate,
Poor
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Pay

Status

Aptitude

$38

Table 6.2 outlines the framing manipulation chart for a high status subject whose
study was framed in terms of costs. Subjects were told that they would typically earn up
to $38 for their participation in the second half of the study. However, reflecting difficult
economic times, the organization would be cutting salaries. As in the Reward conditions,
they were told that their salary would be determined by their handedness and by their
aptitude test score. However, emphasis was placed on the fact that this was a salary cut,
rather than just a payment to them. Salaries were adjusted down from $38, with cuts
ranging from $0 to $28.00 for high status participant. Low status subjects were
guaranteed a salary cut ranging from $24.50 - $28. For low status subjects, costs for
doing well on the test were larger than those of ostensible high status others. They could
never receive a salary cut less than $24.50. However, a high score on the aptitude test
would still result in a smaller salary cut than if they scored lower on the test. Thus, low
status subjects are incentivized to obtain mediocre scores; enough to get by, but not
extraordinarily high. In addition to the financial costs associated with performance,
subjects were also told that since low status subjects tend not to score very high on these
kinds of tests, when they do, it is usually due to cheating. High status subjects did not
face such accusations.

Mediating Variable: Effort
Remember that a major focal point of socially motivated underachievement is that
students consciously choose to underperform. To assess this, we used both a self-report
and a behavioral measure. Immediately following the ostensible work group test,
participants rated statements that evaluated their effort, the importance of the test to them,
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and their overall motivation to do well (see Appendix C). This measure has been used in
much prior research into motivation and test-taking (Sundre and Moore 2002). We also
measured the time that students spent taking the test to approximately a tenth of a second.
We measured this at the test level, rather than at the item level, in order to obtain a
measure of the effort given overall. Time spent taking a test has been linked to effort in
previous work (Wise and Kong 2005).

Dependent Variable: Mental Ability Test Score
We assessed mental ability using the Advanced Raven Progressive Matrices test (see
Appendix D for a sample question). The “Raven” provides reliable and valid measures of
mental ability and has been shown to correlate well with other measures of general
intelligence (Raven, Court and Raven 1992; Jensen 1992). We chose it because it does
not contain questions that are typically recognized as mental ability test questions. This
reduces the chances that subjects will be affected by a priori performance expectations.
Additionally, because there is no reading involved in the test, it is less culture-bound and
thus less biased against minorities (Rushton et al. 2004). Furthermore, the Raven is selfadministered, which eliminates the chance for any bias by the test-givers. Based on a pretest of two versions of the Raven of varying difficulty, we found that the Advanced
version was more suitable for a college population (see Appendix A). The use of the test
is rationalized to subjects by informing them that it will determine their role in the
ostensive second part of the study.

41

Hypotheses
This research design teases apart the effects that those of differing status experience due
to differing reward and costs structures. The following two hypotheses confirm previous
work on status and cost framing (Lovaglia et al. 1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1992):

H1: There will be a main effect of Status. Those who are made to feel of low status will
score lower on the Raven’s than those who are made to feel of high status.
H2: There will be a main effect of Framing. Those who perceive their study in terms of
Costs will score lower on the Raven’s than those who perceive their study in terms of
Rewards.

Uniquely, we also expect status and framing to interact to produce the largest score
decrements of all. Earlier we derived that all else being equal, if an actor is low in status
and expects lower rewards and higher costs for high performance, s/he will seek to avoid
costs rather than to obtain rewards (D1). By substituting our operational instantiations of
the foregoing theoretical discussion, we hypothesize the following:

H3: There will be an interaction effect of Status and Framing. Those who are made to
feel low status and who perceive their study in terms of Costs will score lower on the
Raven’s than all else.
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CHAPTER 7
STUDY ONE: ANALYSES
Subjects
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes at the University of South Carolina
and assigned randomly to experimental conditions. All subjects were prescreened to be
white, right-handed females. Approximately 38 subjects participated in each condition, a
number that in comparable studies has proven sufficiently powerful to detect moderate
differences across conditions5. Each subject was paid $10 for participation in the study.

Data
Data was excluded for one of the following reasons: 1) lack of task orientation or
comprehension (3 participants); and 2) disbelief that handedness contributed to an
increased/decreased task ability (16 participants). This left 152 analyzable cases6.
Of these cases all were female. All reported their race as white in the pre-study,
however during the actual study, five people categorized themselves as White-Hispanic
or Other. We kept these cases in the analysis because of their previous reports and
because this should not theoretically effect results.

5

See Appendix E for an analysis of statistical power to detect differences between conditions.

6

Studies using the standardized experimental setting typically eliminate about 15% of cases due to scope

violations. Our exclusion rate of 12.5% is typical for SCT studies (Dippong 2012).
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Regression Analysis
Regression Diagnostics.
Prior to analysis, data were checked to ensure that they upheld the assumptions of linear
regression. Data were normally distributed, homoschedastic and no collinearity was
present. Prior to model building, we ran an analysis for multivariate outliers on the full
model using Cook’s Distance. We eliminated 8 cases because they had a distance greater
than 4/n (Bollen and Jackman 1990). This means that these cases have high leverage and
are highly influential. Thus, they can bias the regression analysis by showing undue
weight.

Model Building.
We began our analysis by including the main effects, interaction and all of the control
variables in the model. However, an F-test for nested models showed that constraining
High School GPA and College GPA resulted in improved model fit, F(2,137)= .184, p=
.832 (see Appendix F for calculations). We chose use this more parsimonious and better
fitting model, despite that the results were robust to the inclusion of these variables
because keeping these two variables in the model would be equivalent to parameterizing
noise (see Table 7.1).

Final Model.
Controlling for college admission test scores, we found a significant interaction effect of
status and framing. Low status subjects scored the worst on the Raven when they
believed that a high performance would be costly to them, b= 2.927(1.304), p< .05. This
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confirms Hypothesis 1. Status and framing also each have an independent main effect on
test scores, b= -2.326(.894), p< .01 and b=-2.647(.900), p< .01, respectively, thus
confirming Hypotheses 2 and 3 (see Table 7.1).
Those who felt low status scored almost a full point lower on average than those
who felt high status. Subjects who believed that their scores would be associated with
high social and financial costs scored about 1.5 points lower on average than those who
believed that their scores would be associated with low social and financial rewards (see
Table 7.2). The largest score decrement occurred when low status subjects were put in a
position in which they believed that they would endure costs for achievement. Their
scores were lowest of all, nearly 2.5 points below the highest scores and over a full point
below the average test-taker.

Table 7.1. F-Test of Nested Models: Study One.

Intercept
Independent Variables
Status
Framing
Status*Framing
College Admission Test
Scores
College GPA
High School GPA

Model 1
B (SE)

Model 2
B(SE)

25.480 (4.401)***

25.384 (.633)***

-2.323 (.900)*
-2.622 (.914)**
2.876 (1.324)*
2.360 (.355)***

-2.326 (.894)**
-2.647 (.900)**
2.927 (1.304)*
2.374 (.338)***

1.892 (3.918)
-2.029 (4.122)

Omnibus F
Note: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.

9.545
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14.394

Table 7.2. Predicted Marginal Means.
Manipulation
High Status, Reward Frame
High Status, Cost Frame
Low Status, Reward Frame
Low Status, Cost Frame

Raven Test Score
25.111 (2.325)
23.222 (2.079)
23.842 (2.091)
22.647 (2.500)

Mediation Analysis.
In addition to the main effects and interaction, we tested a mediation model to determine
why low status subjects whose study was framed as costly tended to have lower scores
than everyone else. The mediator in question was a behavioral indicator of effort
measured by the amount of time spent on the test. We are confident that time spent on the
test was an accurate measure of effort, rather than some other indicator because time
spent on the test was highly correlated with self-report measures of effort, but not with
self-report measures of test importance (see Table 7.3).

Table 7.3. Pearson r Bivariate Correlations.
Time Spent on Test
Note: **=p<.01

Self-Reported Effort
.228**

Self-Reported Test Importance
.020

We first determined that independent variables significantly predict the dependent
variable. As evidenced above in Table 7.1, controlling for college admission scores,
status, framing, the interaction of status and framing all significantly predicted Ravens
test score. Table 7.4 identifies that only status predicts the mediator variable of effort, b=
-5.836 (2.133), p< .01. This means that we can only continue testing whether the status
effect is mediated by effort. Table 7.5 shows that the effort is significantly related to
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Ravens score, b= .168 (.033), p <.001. Finally, when effort is accounted for in the model,
status loses its effect on Ravens score, b= -1.343 (.844), p=ns. Additionally, Sobel’s Test
shows that the indirect effect is significant, -2.410 (.407), p<.05. Given these
calculations, effort significantly mediates the relationship between status and test score.
This means that low status individuals scored lower on the Ravens test because they put
forth less effort.

Table 7.4. Independent Variables Predicts Effort.
B(SE)
32.814 (1.509)***

Intercept
Independent Variables
Status
Framing
Status*Framing
Standardized Test Scores
Note: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.

-5.836 (2.133)**
-2.184 (2.146)
4.991 (3.110)
2.172 (.806)**

Table 7.5. Effort Mediates the Effect of Status on Raven’s Score.
B(SE)
19.858 (1.220)***

Intercept
Independent Variables
Status
Framing
Status*Framing
Standardized Test Scores
Time Spent on Test
Note: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.

-1.343 (.844)
-2.279 (.830)**
2.087 (1.209)
2.009 (.319)***
.168 (.033)***

47

CHAPTER 8
STUDY TWO: METHODS
General Procedures
The procedures of Study Two largely mirrored that of the first study. Participants were
guided through a computer program that collected demographic information, presented
the experimental manipulations, and administered a test that would ostensibly place the
subject in a job and pay grade for the second part of the study. Again, we were only
interested in the effects of the experimental and control variables on the test score and, as
such, no group work ever occurred.

Design
We used a completely randomized design wherein all subjects were made to believe that
they were of low status and that success on the test would be both socially and financially
costly. Conditions differed based on the expected source of the costs. Either an in-group
member or an out-group member was thought to be responsible for creating the costly
conditions that discouraged success on the test.

Invoking Group Membership
Participants believed that both students from the University of South Carolina and its
rival institution, Clemson University, were enrolled in the study. Following demographic
questions, their identity as a student at USC was invoked by having students rate how
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much they like being a student at USC and by writing why they chose to attend the USC
over Clemson University. They were then told that

According to research, people who attend the same university are likely to
be more similar to one another than they might expect. These similarities
include several dimensions, such as worldview, values, attitudes and
behaviors. This means that those who also attend the University of South
Carolina may be more similar to you than those who attend Clemson
University. We do not know all of the reasons why those who attend the
same college tend to be more similar to one another than those who attend
different colleges, but we do know that this similarity exists and has been
shown in many other research studies. One of the goals of today's study is
to find out more about this.

We assessed the strength of participant’s identification with the in-group by
asking them a series of questions that were designed to evaluate their identity level.
Questions included how much participants saw themselves as group members, how much
they felt strong ties to other group members… etc. (see Appendix G). We collected
responses to these questions both before and after the status manipulation to ensure that it
did not negatively affect a participant’s willingness to identify with the group.
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Independent Variables: Status Manipulation
Again, we controlled perceived status differences. However, this time, participants
believed that the members of a group with which they were affiliated, their university,
possessed either the high or low state of a status characteristic. After having the subject
select if they were affiliated with the University of South Carolina or Clemson
University, the computer program informed them that in the second half of the study they
will be working on a difficult group task that requires cooperation. They were told that
ability at this task is strongly related to institutional affiliation. We provided several
justifications to associate members of the subjects’ rival college affiliation with traits that
are integral to the successful completion of the group task. At the same time, we
associated members of the subjects’ institution with traits related to unsuccessful task
outcomes (see Appendix H). Therefore, all participants were assigned to the low status
position based on their institutional affiliation. As we showed in Study One and in the
pre-test sections (see Appendix A), these methods are quite successful at turning
somewhat arbitrary characteristics into markers of status distinction. Participants were
informed of all deceptions during the debriefing session that followed the study.

Independent Variables: Framing Manipulation
We used the same framing manipulation as that of Study One, except that all subjects
experienced costs associated with success. Table 8.1 outlines the framing manipulation
chart. Remember that all subjects were made to think that those who attend the
University of South Carolina do worse at group tasks than those who attend Clemson
University. In this way, costs for doing well on the test were larger for those of low status
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than those of ostensible high status. Subjects were also told that the high scores of low
status participants were suspect because of the likelihood that they were due to cheating.
The treat of a referral to the academic integrity team was meant to invoke a social cost.

Table 8.1. Cost Framing Manipulation.
Job
Status Aptitude
and
Group
USC
Superior
Psychotherapist

Pay
Cut

Pay

-$0

$38

Status
and
Group

Aptitude

USC

Moderate

Technician

-$24.50

$13.50

Clemson

Superior

USC

Poor

Orderly

-$28.00

$10.00

Clemson

Moderate,
Poor

Independent Variable: Source of Costs for High Achievement
Since participants thought that both students from the University of South Carolina and
its rival institution, Clemson University, were enrolled in the study, this allowed us to
convince them that either an in-group member (a student at the University of South
Carolina) or an out-group member (a student at Clemson University) was responsible for
creating the job and pay charts that were associated with the ostensible second part of the
study. They were told that

To try to optimize group performance, we ran a previous study to
determine the best way to pay you for your participation in this study. In
this previous study, we asked [students] to rate pay charts. We asked them
to select the chart that they thought should be used to calculate your pay
for the study. University of South Carolina (Clemson University) students
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decided that your pay should be determined by your college affiliation and
by your score on the aptitude test.

Participants then viewed the framing manipulation chart detailed above. Now,
they not only face costs for success, but they know who was responsible for setting up
this unfair system, either their in-group or their out-group. They were also told that
ordinarily everyone gets paid more for their participation in the study, but that either their
in-group or out-group had decided that the tough economic times warranted a decrease in
pay for everyone else. In this way, social and financial costs for high achievement were
either imposed by an in-group or out-group member. Manipulations such as these have
been used in much prior research and have been successful at eliciting group-minded
behavior (Tajfel 1979).

Hypotheses
This research delineates how in-group and out-group sanctioning affects test scores.
Theoretically, all else being equal, if an actor expects high costs from an in-group
member, they will seek to avoid these costs (D2). Again, we hypothesize the following
by substituting measurable instances of the theoretical arguments:

H1: There will be a main effect of Group Membership. Those who anticipate costs from
an in-group member will score lower on the Raven’s than those who anticipate costs from
an out-group member.
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CHAPTER 9
STUDY TWO: ANALYSES
Subjects and General Procedures
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes at the University of South Carolina
and assigned randomly to experimental conditions. Again, all subjects were prescreened
to be white, right-handed females. Seventeen subjects participated in each condition and
each subject was paid $10 for participation in the study. Procedures for this follow-up
study mirrored that of the initial study, but differed only in regards to the manipulation
detailed below.

Data
Data was excluded for one participant because of a lack of belief about the veracity of the
manipulation. This left 34 analyzable cases. Of these cases all were female. All reported
their race as white in the pre-study, however during the actual study, one person
categorized themselves as White-Hispanic. We kept this cases in the analysis because of
their previous reports and because this should not theoretically effect results.

Descriptive Statistics
Group membership represented the experimentally manipulated variable indicating
whether participants thought that their in-group or out-group sanctioned high test
performance. We also administrated a series of questions that probed into the level of
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identification that participants had with their in-group. Principal components analysis
indicated that these questions indicated a latent concept as 84.16% of the variance was
modeled by the extracted component. We standardized the responses and combined them
into a scale measure of level of group identification (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1. Principal Components Analysis.
Group Identification Question
See Myself as Part of the Group
Pleased to be a Part of the Group
Strong Ties to the Group
Identify with the Group
Group/Self Interconnectedness

Factor Loading
.873
.915
.939
.937
.922

Given that intelligence tests are correlated with other academic measures, we
collected information about subjects’ educational background during pre-study
questionnaires. They reported an estimate of their high school and college grade point
averages and either their ACT or SAT scores. College admissions test scores were
standardized to account for their different scales of measurement. Participants also
recorded self-reports of both their mother and father’s level of education. These reports
were collapsed into binary categories indicating whether or not a college degree was
obtained. Finally, we computed the time that each subject spent working on the test.
We analyzed the descriptives of each parameter. Table 9.2 presents the mean,
standard deviation, skew and kurtosis of each variable. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
showed that the dependent variable is normally distributed, D= .141, p=.084.
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Table 9.2. Descriptive Statistics.
Parameter
Independent Variables
Group Membership
College Admissions Test
Score
Effort on Test (TS_Total)
Level of Group Identification
College GPA
High School GPA
Mother’s Level of Education
Father’s Level of Education
Dependent Variables
Raven’s Test Score

Mean (SD)

Skew

Kurtosis

--- (---)
.000 (.953)

---.652

--1.28

32.128 (7.71)
.000 (4.478)
.863 (.103)
.888 (.094)
.765 (---)
.824 (---)

-.091
-1.53
-.825
-1.107
-----

-.963
1.707
-.064
1.263
-----

23.794 (4.637)

-.070

-.924

Regression Analysis
Regression Diagnostics
Before model building, we tested the data for collinearity, heteroscedasticity, and
outliers. Variance inflation factors indicated no collinearity (see Table 9.3). The BreuschPagen test showed that the data were homoscedastic, x2=.002, p= 0.964. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the dependent variable is normally distributed, D=
.141, p=.084. Prior to model building, we ran an analysis for multivariate outliers on the
full model using Cook’s Distance. We eliminated two cases because they had a distance
greater than 4/n, indicating their undue influence on the regression coefficients (Bollen
and Jackman 1990).
Table 9.3. Collinearity Diagnostics.
Parameter
Variance Inflation Factor
Group Membership
1.29
Standardized Test Score
1.08
Effort on Test (TS_Total)
1.28
Note: Variance Inflation Factors less than 10 indicate no collinearity.
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Model Building. A series of F-tests for nested models showed that constraining College
and High School GPA, Mother’s and Father’s level of education, and identification with
the group resulted in improved model fit, F(4,25) = 0.311, p = 0.868 and F(1,29) = 1.817,
p = 0.188 (see Appendix I for calculations). We chose use this more parsimonious and
better fitting model, despite that the results were robust to the inclusion of these variables
because keeping these variables in the model would be equivalent to parameterizing noise
(see Table 9.4).
Rather than including effort on the test as a mediator, we chose to include it as a
control in this model. We did this because in the prior analysis, effort only mediated the
relationship between perceived status and test score. In this study, there were no status
differences between participants and, as such, we should not expect to find any
differences in effort.

Final Model
Controlling for college admission test scores and effort on test, we found that those who
anticipated that a high score on the test would result in both financial and social costs
from a member of their in-group scored lower than if those costs were perceived to come
from someone in their out-group. Table 9.5 shows the predicted marginal means per
condition. Those who perceived in-group costs for success scored almost 2 points lower
than those who thought that their costs came from an out-group member.
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Table 9.4. F-Test of Nested Models: Study Two.
Model 1
B (SE)

Model 2
B (SE)

Model 3
B (SE)

Intercept

14.557 (9.769)

10.142 (4.657)*

9.594 (4.702)*

Independent Variables
Group Membership
College Admissions Test Score
Effort on Test (TS_Total)
Level of Group Identification
College GPA
High School GPA
Mother’s Level of Education
Father’s Level of Education

4.089 (1.697)*
2.359 (.912)*
.194 (.107)+
.217 (.184)
6.539 (8.371)
-9.790 (9.867)
-.148 (2.519)
.049 (2.548)

4.421 (1.504)**
2.190 (.755)**
.219 (.099)*
.209 (.155)

4.431 (1.524)**
1.943 (.743)*
.235 (.100)*

4.647**

5.443**

Omnibus F
2.258+
Note: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001.

Table 9.5. Predicted Marginal Means.
Manipulation
Perceived In-Group Costs
Perceived Out-Group Costs

Raven Test Score
22.82 (4.69)
24.76 (4.51)
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CHAPTER 10
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We found that the academic performance of low status individuals is most prominently
affected by situations where they perceive high achievement as costly. This is especially
pronounced when achievement is sanctioned by in-group members. Findings from Study
One indicated about a half of a standard deviation difference in tests scores between the
highest and lowest scoring conditions. To illustrate what these findings mean relative to
standard IQ norms, Figure 10.1 details both Raven’s scores and their normed equivalents.
Those who were made to feel low status and experienced costs for success scored, on
average, 22.65. Whereas, everyone else scored, on average, 24.05. That is equivalent to
losing about 6 points on the IQ. To emphasize how large these score differences are,
Table 10.1 details other processes that similarly decrease scores alongside their respective
score differences. Our findings indicate that perceiving yourself to be of relative low
status and expecting costs associated with success is almost as detrimental to scores as
taking the test without sleeping the night before, being chronically drunk, or becoming
elderly (Linde and Bergstrom 1992; Ponton et al. 1996; Jones and Parsons 1971).
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Figure 10.1 Raven’s Scores in Relation to Normed IQs.
Table 10.1. Comparable Score Decrements and Their Processes.
Process
Approximate Score Decrement
Sleep deprivation

1 SD

Chronic alcohol consumption

1 SD

Becoming elderly

1 SD

Perceived low status and costs for achievement

½ SD

Effort as a Mediator
Reduced effort was the path by which low status subjects in our study underachieved.
Unlike previous studies that identified test anxiety (a largely non-conscious phenomena)
to lower scores, our study showed that students actively put forth less effort, if conditions
were set such that there was a structural ceiling for their accomplishments. They both
took less time to complete the test than high status others who had no such ceiling. This
shows that the scores of low status individuals may not only not reflect their actual
abilities, but that their underperformance could also be a reaction to larger social
processes at play.
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While behavioral indicators of effort show that effort mediated the relationship
between status and test score, self-report measures of effort did not serve as a mediator in
Study One. This is consistent with other work on socially motivated underachievement
that would able to isolate relationships between behavioral indicators, but not self-report
measures (White et al. 2002). This may have happened because while our measure of
time spent taking the test occurred during the test, participant’s filled out our self-report
questionnaires after the experiment was over. Their memory of how hard they tried could
have been compromised. In addition, there could have been a demand effect where they
fictitiously inflated their level of effort to be in line with researcher expectations.

Crystallized and Fluid Intelligence
Our measure of intelligence, the Raven's, is one of only a few intelligence tests to be
lauded as culturally non-dependent (Jensen 1980). This makes our findings even more
pronounced. We were able to observe score decrements even under conditions where
environmental factors should be the least effectual. Environmental factors, such as the
social processes described throughout, are more important when the test is known to be
culturally biased or when the subsets of the test measure crystallized intelligence (Kan et
al. 2013). In classrooms and other testing environments, administrators typically use the
WISC or WAIS tests to place students into special needs classrooms or to grant them
admission to gifted and talented programs. These tests are comprised of subscales that
measure both fluid and crystallized intelligence. As it stands, approximately half of the
overall score on these tests are determined by measures that we know to be highly
culturally dependent. Furthermore, the SAT and ACT, which greatly influence college
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admissions decisions are purely measures of crystallized intelligence, as their scores are
based on achievement rather than aptitude. They are, thus, the most culturally biased of
all. Yet, despite that we know that the scores of disadvantaged test-takers are
handicapped by these measures, we continue to administer these tests and use them to
determine important life outcomes. This, in effect, stacks the cards squarely against those
of low status. If we were able to induce score decrements of almost half of a standard
deviation on a test that measures only fluid intelligence, it would follow that scores on
these more culturally dependent tests would decrease much further.

Relevance for Status Interventions
Understanding how perceptions of social rewards and costs affect intelligence test
performances is important for efforts to intervene in the status component. For instance,
scholars have developed intervention strategies to lessen the association of low status
with low ability. These promote equal influence in collective task settings by cancelling
out the effects of status characteristics and have been shown to lessen or eliminate the
effects of diffuse status characteristics such as gender (Lockheed and Hall 1976; Pugh
and Wahrman 1983), race (Cohen and Roper 1972; Lohman 1972; Webster and Driskell
1978) and educational attainment (Markovsky et al. 1984), as well as specific
characteristics such as reading ability and academic reputation (Tammivaara 1982;
Rosenholtz 1977).
Ridgeway (1982) showed that when low status actors assert themselves as groupmotivated rather than self-motivated, they were able to overcome the low-status handicap
and attain high influence. For Pugh and Wahrman (1983), interventions either consisted
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of verbal statements of equality, demonstrations of equality or demonstrations of
superiority of low status actors. They found that only the low status actors who
demonstrated their superior competence were able to lessen status effects. Additionally,
Cohen and Roper (1972) found that status effects were only lessened when low status
actors demonstrate their superior competence by serving as teachers of high status actors.
These interventions introduced new status information that effectively overcame
low status, but still left unexplained the sources for the actual performance decrements
that have been shown to be associated with low status. Essentially the interventions took
broad, scattershot approaches to resolving the problem. Our research stands to provide a
more refined understanding of the process, in turn allowing milder and more subtle
interventions to be tested and applied in future research.

Future Research
This research improved our understanding of an underlying mechanism driving
variability in mental ability test scores. We hope to continue this line of research in the
future, building on the findings from this project in designing more efficient and subtle
kinds of status interventions for increasingly naturalistic settings. Returning to one of our
original motivations, this research addressed an anomalous finding regarding aptitude test
performance for low status versus high status group members— the observation that,
even in the absence of any real aptitude differences, some minority group members
(African Americans) score lower than majority group members (Caucasians), while
females score as well as males. Such findings may have been due to perceived rewards
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and costs that were factors for the test-takers, but left unmeasured in the research settings
that produced those findings.
The perception of higher costs associated with high performance in low status
actors can be further investigated as a mediating factor between status and mental ability
test scores. In fact, a complement to this study is in the works that shows how those of
different statuses differentially perceive rewards and costs for outstanding academic
achievement.
In addition to our follow-up studies, this research can be replicated in the lab and
also confirmed in more natural settings. In the future, the assertion that low status actors
perform under their ability on tests because of costs associated with high performance
can be expanded to encapsulate other aspects of education. For example, does the
perception of high costs have effects on other types of tests, such as the SAT and GRE?
Do these results generalize to less critical test situations, such as a high-school biology
midterm?
Our research design and procedures could be used in many future projects. For
example, our study uses the Raven test because of its cultural neutrality. Our results
would establish a baseline by which to compare the effects of perceived rewards and
costs on more culturally biased tests. This would allow researchers to examine the extent
to which cultural biased tests either exacerbate or ease status-related beliefs.
Additionally, our design could apply more directly to research on stereotype threat.
Future studies could manipulate the presentation of the mental ability test as either a test
or a filler task. If there are differences between test- takers that are knowingly taking a
mental ability test as opposed to thinking that they are taking a filler task, then
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researchers could tell much of the effect is attributable to group-stereotypes verses statusbeliefs. In short, this study could be the beginning of a program of research about the
effects of status, costs and academic performance.
The more thorough our understanding of the mechanisms behind these
phenomena, the better our ability to eliminate the arbitrary inequities and long-term
disadvantages that can result from status processes that have little or nothing to do with
the task at hand. This could be a key to lessening the achievement gap between high and
low status actors. For this reason, it is important to isolate the underpinnings of statusbased differences in test performance and then to develop methods for offsetting them.
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APPENDIX A: PRE-TESTS
Pre-testing is the use of small pilot studies that allow the researcher to gauge, amongst
other things, the precision of survey instruments, the flow of procedures, and the
appropriateness of their experimental manipulations. In this case, we pre-tested a number
of factors that could be influential to the outcome of the main studies. First, we wanted to
ensure that our dependent variable, the Ravens Progressive Matrices, was appropriate for
the population. We ran a pilot study of two versions of this test: the standard and the
advanced. Using measurement theory, we were able to discriminate between test versions
and choose the version most suitable to the main study’s population. The function of the
second pre-test was to assure us that one of the main experimental manipulations
functioned as expected. We ran a pre-study that measured the effect of the handedness
manipulation on the display of status-oriented behavior. We found that this techniques
was, indeed, successful at producing the desired effects. Below, we detail the rationale
behind the use of each pre-test, the procedures that we used, the outcomes, and their
implications for the main studies.

Pre-test One: Ravens Progressive Matrices Test Version
The Raven Progressive Matrices (the “Ravens”) provides a reliable and valid measure of
mental ability and has been shown to correlate well with other tests of general
intelligence (Raven, Court and Raven 1992; Jensen 1992). However, unlike other
intelligence measures, it uses non-verbal questions. This suppresses any effects that may
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have arisen from language deficits. Non-verbal items also make the Ravens test less
culture-bound and thus less biased against minorities (Jensen 1974).
During the testing session, each subject is asked to identify a missing element that
completes a pattern (see Appendix D for an illustration). The patterns get increasingly
difficult as the subject moves through the test. They must complete the Ravens within a
given time frame that varies with each version of the test. The two versions of interest to
this study are the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (the “Standard”) and the Ravens
Advanced Progressive Matrices (the “Advanced”). The Standard is composed of 5 sets of
12 questions, totaling 60 potential points. This test is typically administered to children
and adults of average intelligence. The Advanced, on the other hand, contains 36 total
questions. Test administrators have marketed this version of the Ravens for adults who
score near perfect scores on the Standard, making the Advanced the test of choice for
those of above-average intelligence.
Scholars have used the Ravens to study sociological outcomes, such as
educational potential and achievement, gender differences in spatial reasoning, and birth
order and intelligence (Rohde and Thompson 2006; Geary, Saults, Liu and Hoard 2000;
Belmont and Morolla 1973). However, to date, only two studies in the group processes
research tradition have utilized the Ravens as a dependent variable. Lovaglia et al. (1998)
used the Standard to determine how social status affected performance on intelligence
tests. They noted, however, that the scores obtained using the Standard may be prone to a
ceiling effect. In one of the three studies reported, subjects scored an average of 56 out of
60 points. While only two participants received perfect scores, it seems that such large
range restriction might have detrimental effects on hypothesis testing. Aware of the
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potential problems with the Standard, Youngreen et al. (2009) used the Advanced as the
outcome measure in their study about identity maintenance and test performance. While
they reported none of the problems occurring in the Lovaglia et al. (1998) study, their
study did not provide much descriptive information about the test scores.
Since we had no conclusive reason to assume that one test was more suited for
our main study than the other, we pre-tested both versions of the Ravens in our
population. The test that we ultimately decided to use would need to satisfy the following
requirements. First, it would need to produce a normal distribution. Most statistical tests
require that cases sampled on the dependent variable come from a normal distribution.
This means that the skewness and kurtosis statistics should be close to 0, cases examined
with a Q-Q Plot should fall near the plotted line, and 99.9% of standardized scores should
fall between -3.30 and 3.30. While there are, of course, statistical techniques to correct
for non-normal distributions, it is always best to choose a dependent variable that needs
the fewest transformations.
Secondly, the chosen test would need to produce the most variability. Tests that
do not have the potential to produce variable scores on the dependent variable are poor
indicators of the construct being measured. Tests that do produce high variability will
have a large range of scores and a high variance coefficient. Variance statistics alone may
be misleading, however. Since total variance is equal to the sum of both true score and
error variance, a test may have a high variance simply because it contains a large amount
of measurement error. To ensure this is not the case, the chosen test must also show a
higher proportion of variance due to true score rather than error variance. This can be
ascertained by examining the components of the KR-20 reliability statistic.
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Finally, in addition to variability on the outcome, a good test will have maximum
item variance, as well. This means that subjects will have about a 50/50 chance of
answering any given question correctly. Higher percentages of per question correct scores
may indicate a ceiling effect while lower percentages show the potential for a floor effect.

Design and Method
To test which version of the Ravens was more suitable for our main study, we employed
a two condition between-subjects completely randomized design. Twenty Caucasian
participants (12 females) were recruited from lower-level undergraduate classes at the
University of South Carolina. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a
computerized version of either the Standard or the Advanced. Upon completion of the
test, subjects were debriefed about the nature of the study and paid $10 for their
participation.

Results and Discussion
We computed test score for each condition by giving one point per correct answer. The
mean score for the Standard was 48 (SD = 5.312) out of a potential 59 points. The
distribution was negatively skewed (-.239, SE = .687) with a kurtosis of .331 (SE =
1.334). The mean score for the Advanced was 19.20 (SD = 7.223) out of a potential 36
points. The distribution had a positive skew (.217, SE = .687) and a kurtosis of -.627 (SE
= 1.334). We standardized scores for each test version and discovered that no scores in
either condition lay outside of the -3.3 to 3.3 range. Data points in each condition varied
from the line in Q-Q plots, but with such a small sample size, it was difficult to draw
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conclusions from this graph alone. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality indicated that
scores on both the Standard and the Advanced were drawn from a normal distribution
(.958, p = .764, .957, p = .865, respectively). Since both tests produce a normal
distribution, we will focus on their differences in variance.
To test which version of the Ravens produced the most variability, we first looked
at the range of scores. Out of a possible 59 points, scores on the Standard ranged from 38
to 56 points. Scores ranged between 9 and 32 points out of a possible 36 points on the
Advanced. This shows that the Advanced produces a broader range of scores in our
population, despite its scale being structurally restricted because of the smaller number of
items. This is further indicated by the variance of each test; the Standard had a lower
variance (σ2 = 28.222) than the Advanced (σ2 = 52.178), despite having more items.
Further analysis of the variance components computed using KR-20 indicates that
69.47% of the total variance of scores on the Standard was due to true score variance,
whereas 85.19% of the score variance of the Advanced was attributed to true score
differences. This not only means that the Advanced is a more reliable indicator, but that
the variance on this test was not inflated because of measurement error.
To further discriminate between versions, we looked at the item variances of each
test. Again, a good test will produce item variances of .5, indicating an item correct to
item incorrect ratio of 50:50. On average, subjects answered 81% of Standard items
correctly, whereas subjects answered 53% of Advanced items correctly. This shows that
subjects were more likely to produce variable scores on each item when taking the
Advanced rather than the Standard version of the Ravens.
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Conclusions
Different versions of the Ravens have been used across disciplines to measure
intelligence. Each version has its own caveats that can have consequences on research.
For this reason, it is always best to know which version of the test will best suit the
sample population. Our analysis shows that the Advanced version of the Ravens produces
a normal distribution, a larger variance due to true score differences and larger item
variances than the Standard version of the Ravens. This makes it a much better indicator
of intelligence for our population.

Pre-test Two: Status Manipulation
The expectation states research program is known for its theoretical precision and
methodological standardization. The wide-spread use of similar procedures in a
standardized experimental setting ensures that findings relate both to one another and to
the theory which spawned them. Within this tradition, status manipulations have been
highly standardized. However, with novel status questions comes the use of novel status
manipulations. How does the researcher make sure that the novel manipulation does what
it is intended to do?
In this part of the appendix, we detail the background of Status Characteristics
Theory as it relates to novel status manipulations. Then, we turn to an analysis of a new
status manipulation: the handedness manipulation. We look to answer the following
question: when utilizing a novel status manipulation, how do you know if it is successful
in invoking status differences? Should you rely on the observed between condition
relational differences or a comparison of observed and predicted values? We argue that
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each approach yields useful information and then we provide evidence that reconciles the
divide between these approaches.

Status Characteristics Theory
Inspired by the work of Bales (1950), Berger and colleagues (1966; 1972; 1977)
developed a general theoretical account explaining how an individual’s seemingly
arbitrary personal characteristics can lead to them having more influence over a group.
This theory, Status Characteristics Theory (SCT), asserts that when group members are
oriented toward a collective and valued task, certain characteristics will differentiate the
group members and ultimately affect the status hierarchy of the group.

The Standard Experimental Setting. In addition to the graph theoretic model that is used
to make predictions about the relative status advantage of actors, SCT has developed a
standardized experimental setting (SES) that is used to test these predictions. Typically,
the setting consists of two individuals working collectively on a task. Status
characteristics are manipulated by leading participants to believe that they possess more
or less of an ostensibly genuine ability than their partner. This can be done by way of
manipulating innate characteristics, such as “older” or “younger” on an age characteristic
or by differentiating individuals based upon a contrived characteristic, such as “high” or
“low” on a fictitious test. Standardized procedures that differentiate such abilities are the
Meaning Insight, Contrast Sensitivity, or Relational Ability tasks. During these tasks,
individuals are presented with binary-choice questions. The procedure proceeds in three
stages. First they input their initial response. Then they are shown their partner’s
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response. Finally, they are given the opportunity to change or stay with their initial
response. The setting is designed so that participants believe that their partner disagrees
with their initial choice the majority of the time. The extent to which they stay with their
initial response is the variable of interest.
The SES was constructed to test the predictions derived by the formalized
derivations of SCT that use graph theory to construct predicted expectation advantages
(E) between interacting partners that ultimately impact one’s influence (P(s)) (see
Equation 1). Those with a high expectation advantage tend to have high observed P(s)
scores. Conversely, those who the theory predicts to have low expectation advantages
tend to change their initial responses to match that of their perceived high ability partner.
The equation below represents the probability of an actor staying with their own
response, P(s), rather than changing to match that of their partner. P(s) is also influenced
by two parameters, M and Q, discussed in more detail below.

(1) P(s) = m + q(E)

M and Q Parameters. Despite the impressive amount of standardization that the SES
provides, in reality, no two settings are precisely equal. SCT implements two parameters
designed to isolate the situation-specific nature of different settings; these parameters are
M and Q shown in the equation above. M is the baseline tendency for someone to reject
influence attempts. Q captures the effect that a particular expectation advantage has on
the rejection of influence attempts (as well as any other systematic differences between
conditions). Since each experiment takes place within a cultural, locational and temporal
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context, each study contains unique biases. Studies can differ according to participant
gender, number of status manipulations given, or completion incentive… etc. To account
for these differences, the M and the Q parameters can be thought of as variables with
observed values that get tweaked to account for experiment-specific idiosyncrasies and
other systematic effects present in one particular experimental setting and/or condition
(Berger et al. 1977). As such, these parameters tend to be estimated from the data7 and
differ from study to study.
In looking at the progression of the M and Q parameters, we see a move from
situation-specific empirical estimation towards theoretical benchmarks. This is good
because the ultimate goal of theoretical development is to replace such situation-specific
constants with best predicted estimates. As tests of theoretical premises cumulate, this
should give rise to an expanding theoretical scope. In other words, the goal is to
approximate not just the baseline tendency for a particular subject to reject influence
under certain conditions in a unique experiment, but the baseline tendency for anyone
under any conditions to reject influence attempts. The more parameters that are
theoretically derived, the closer we come to reaching such an ideal. Luckily, researchers
can capitalize on SCT’s long history of standardized experiments. Standardization of
processes gives us confidence that computing an average M and Q derived from all
applicable SCT studies should approximate the true value of M and Q for any other given
study. In time, as the number of standardized studies becomes even larger, it will become
increasingly likely that the average M and Q taken from these studies is equal to the first
moment in the distribution of M and Q.

7

In terms of the linear model, M and Q correspond to the slope and intercept of the model, respectively.
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Kalkhoff and Thye’s (2006) meta-analysis was the first step towards such a goal.
They pooled SCT studies and identified conditions under which M and Q vary. They
show that protocol variations, number of trials, sample size and exclusion rates all affect
the observed M and Q. In addition to identifying these deviations, they calculate an
average M and Q and encourage future researchers to “use these new estimates as a
benchmark to assess the (ir)regularity of their own results” (Kalkhoff and Thye 2006, p.
221). Such work is primarily useful because researchers can now measure the degree to
which a particular experimental setting deviates from the SES. It can even help to
pinpoint if this deviation comes from an experiment-wide peculiarity in the tendency to
reject influence (M) or if these differences are due to a particular condition (Q).

Novel Status Manipulations. Another consequence of Kalkhoff and Thye (2006) is that
researchers who are interested in implementing novel status manipulations can now
compare the strength of these manipulations to an established norm. While the SES is the
foundation of SCT research, as research broadens the scope of the theory, novel status
manipulations are increasingly utilized.
While the SES traditionally focused on dyadic relationships, researchers are also
interested in status effects in groups sized larger than two interactants. Testing SCT
predictions in a different setting dictated an alteration of the SES to accommodate these
interests. Researchers adopted changes to the computer mediated binary-choice
programs, measured new dependent variables, such as group consensus on item ranking
during the Lost on the Moon task, and implemented novel status manipulations.
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Of particular interest to the current paper is the novel status manipulation of
handedness (e.g., Lovaglia et al 1998). During this manipulation, participants are told that
the hand that they dominantly use is associated with either high or low task ability.
Researchers have used this manipulation rather than the standard tasks described earlier
for many reasons. Handedness, as opposed to something like Contrast Sensitivity ability,
is more innate. Individuals have been aware of and have used their handedness for their
entire lives. It is more likely that they would identify with handedness as a status
characteristic than an ability that they just discovered they had or did not have. This
likely increases how much an individual identifies with the manipulation and thus affects
its believability (Lovaglia et al. 1998). Another consideration has been the length of
standard manipulations. If the outcome variable is equally long and similar in format,
participants could easily become fatigued. This could result in end effects on the
dependent variable.
Knowing that even subtle changes to the SES can produce significantly different
outcomes (Troyer 2001), it seems likely that changing the manipulation will cause
deviations from the normative values typically obtained from the SES. When using a
novel manipulation, we must ensure two things: (i) that the manipulation produces the
relational differences predicted between high and low status conditions; and (ii) that the
observed stay response proportions for each condition agree with the proportions
predicted SCT models. The following analysis presents these results.
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Study
The goal of this research is to illustrate how to use Kalkhoff and Thye’s (2006) study to
test the strength of a novel status manipulation. First, we present the results of a dyadic
interaction that invoked status differences with the handedness manipulation. We then
test two models against the data. The first model uses M and Q that are derived from the
data, while the second model uses the mean M and Q taken from 26 studies compiled by
Kalkhoff and Thye (2006). Finally, we present the findings of a Monte Carlo simulation
that reconciles the different findings from each model.

Method
We ran a completely randomized design that used handedness as a status manipulation.
Participants were told that their dominant hand was associated with either high or low
task ability. They were led to believe that they were interacting with another who
possessed the opposite level of competence. The dependent variable was stay response
scores on the Contrast Sensitivity task.

Data
Participants were excluded from our analyses for one of the following reasons: (i)
suspicion that their partner in the task was not real (7 participants) and (ii) disbelief that
handedness contributed to an increased/decreased task ability (2 participants). This left 32
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analyzable cases (16 per cell)8. Of these cases 18 were female and 14 male. All
participants reported their race as white in the pre-study9.

Findings
Table A.1. Mean and Median P(s) for Observed Data.
Condition
High Status

Observed (n=16)
Mean
.711

Median
.743

Low Status

.419

.425

Relational Status Differences. The first step in assessing the effectiveness of the
handedness manipulation was to compare P(s) scores between high and low status
individuals. Table A.1 shows the mean and median observed stay responses for high and
low states of the handedness characteristic. Findings from the Mann-Whitney U test of
difference in medians shows that those who were told that their handedness was
associated with low task ability deferred to their partner more than those who believed
that their handedness resulted in high task competence (U = 28.00, p < .001). This means
that the handedness manipulation was successful in invoking the desired status
differentials between high and low states of the characteristic.

8

Studies using the standardized experimental setting typically eliminate about 15% of cases due to scope

violations. Our exclusion rate of 28% is rather high, but still within the range of 0-50% observed by
Dippong (2012).
9

During the actual study, two people categorized themselves as White-Hispanic and Multi-Ethnic,

respectively. We kept these cases in the analysis because the results with and without them were
qualitatively similar. ̅ of C2 (n=14) = .70 (.12).
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Table A.2. Observed Cell Counts of Stay Responses and Trials Inﬂuenced.
Condition
High Status (C2)

Defer to Partner
92

Stay Response
228

Low Status (C3)

186

134

Table A.3. Predicted Cell Counts and Chi-squared Components: Data-driven.
Condition
High
Status
Low
Status
= 0.0016

Predicted Counts
Defer to
Stay
Partner
Response
92.31
227.69

Residuals
Defer to
Stay
Partner
Response
-0.31
0.31

Components
Defer to
Stay
Partner
Response
0.0011
0.0004

184.92

0.08

0.0004

133.08

-0.08

-0.0006

Theoretical Status Differences. In addition to establishing relational differences, another
goal of SCT researchers is to confirm that their observed scores fall within a theoretically
predicted range. Table A.2 presents the observed cell counts of stay responses and trials
in which the participant deferred to the partner for each condition. Table A.3 presents the
predicted cell counts using the M and Q estimated from the data, the residuals between
the observed cell counts and the expected cell counts, and the Chi-squared components.
The results indicate that the model ﬁts the data (x^2(2) = 0.0016, p = 0.9992). Observed
stay responses for high and low status conditions agreed with predictions.

99

Table A.4. Predicted Cell Counts and Chi-squared Components: Meta-analysis.
Condition
High
Status
Low
Status
= 16.49

Predicted Counts
Defer to
Stay
Partner
Response
87.71
232.29

Residuals
Defer to
Stay
Partner
Response
4.29
-4.29

Components
Defer to
Stay
Partner
Response
0.21
0.08

149.18

35.82

8.60

168.82

-35.82

7.60

Until recently, this analysis (coupled with the significant relational difference
between high and low status conditions) would have been sufficient to conclude that the
handedness manipulation was successful in invoking status differences. However, due to
the methodological improvements made by Kalkhoff and Thye (2006), it is now also
plausible to test the observed stay responses against a predicted model that uses metaanalysis estimates of M and Q. Table A.4 produces these results. Fitting the observed
data against a model that uses M and Q derived from the average of all previously
observed Ms and Qs produces a model that does not ﬁt the data (x^2(2) = 16.49, p <
0.001). While those in the high status condition deferred slightly more than expected, the
largest deviation from the model appears in the low status condition. Here, the theory
predicts that subjects would defer far less than was observed.
Results from these models tell us two different things. One the one hand, there is
evidence that suggests that the handedness manipulation successfully invoked status
differences. We observed significant between-condition median differences.
Additionally, when controlling for situation-specific idiosyncrasies by estimating M and
Q from the data, our observed model fit predictions. However, on the other hand, when
deriving P(s) scores by using the benchmark values of M and Q suggested by Kalkhoff
and Thye (2006), we find that our empirical findings do not square with predictions. The
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low status manipulation is stronger than theoretically predicted. Such contradictory
results prove problematic.

Simulation Study. The following demonstrates how we reconciled the opposing findings
detailed above. Kalkhoff and Thye (2006) report that M and Q are normally distributed
and they report values for 26 studies. Using the data from this analysis, we calculated the
mean and variance of reported Ms (m=.62, σ^2= .06) and Qs (m=.10, σ^2 =.05). We then
simulated a Monte Carlo distribution of 20,000 observations of predicted M and Q values
(see Appendix J for the R code). From these M and Q values, we derived predicted stay
response scores for both a high and low specific status characteristics with a path length
of 3 and 4 (see Appendix K for calculations).

Figure A.1. Simulated Values of the M and Q Parameters.
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Figure A.2. Simulated P(s) Scores for a High and Low Status Actor.

Figure A.1 shows the distribution of predicted M and Q values. Values within the
95% confidence interval range between .50 and .74 for M and from .01 to .19 for Q. Of
the studies cited in the meta-analysis, 96% report M values within the range observed and
92% fall within the predicted range for Q. The handedness manipulation presented earlier
in this paper also is within this range. Assuming a directly relevant specific SC with a
path length of 3 and 4, predicted P(s) scores for a high status actor fall within a 95%
confidence interval of .57 to .87 and .37 to .67 for a low status actor. Figure A.2 produces
the results from the entire simulated distribution. These results are important because
they recognize and illustrate that M and Q are variables with observed values in each
study. Using the means on M and Q to estimate model fit may lead to the wrong
conclusion, as above, because that doesn’t acknowledge that any given study may yield
observed values of M and Q that are within a relatively large, and yet reasonable, range.
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Discussion
Drawing on methodological advancements made by Kalkhoff and Thye (2006), we
provide further refinement of the M and Q estimation process. When implementing a
novel status manipulation, we suggest that researchers should meet two requirements: (i)
that status differences are present between conditions; and (ii) that the predicted stay
response scores fall within a predicted range. Following these guidelines will help to
ensure that novel manipulations have their intended outcomes. It will also help to
preserve the standardization for which the SCT research tradition is known.
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APPENDIX B: STUDY ONE: SCRIPTS
Low Status, Costs

We are investigating the way people come together to form work teams. Today’s work
environments are intensely social. Most people no longer perform their jobs in isolation,
such as on assembly lines. Rather, we usually work more closely with other people who
may be different from us in many respects. Sometimes these differences make working
together difficult; tempers flare and feelings get hurt.

A group has to work together to be successful. But group members normally have
different levels of ability. So as the social interaction of group work becomes more
intense, the ability to get along with others and coordinate the work of diverse group
members becomes especially difficult.

One factor that we are studying here today is whether group members are right-handed or
left-handed. We want to learn more about how these differences affect work group
performance.

Today you will participate in an intense work group. Each of you will be assigned a job
in a mock mental health treatment center. All of your fellow group members will be
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women. Your interactions with the other group members will be observed, videorecorded and coded by trained sociologists.

Before you enter the work group, we would like to tell you more about what previous
studies about right-handed and left-handed workers show.

Previous research has shown that left-handed workers are much better at coordinating
group work and getting things done in groups. In general, left-handers make better
leaders. Social scientists are not exactly sure why left-handers are better at these tasks
than right-handers, although certain psychological processes having to do with the left
and right brain are thought to cause this effect.

In contrast, right-handers are too inflexible and likely to make poor decisions. Righthanders may be so rigid that they cannot lead a group effectively, though they sometimes
make good followers. For this reason, right-handers in positions of leadership are often
resented by other team members. This further hampers the ability of right-handers to
work in groups. In addition, right-handers are often too subservient.

In general, left-handers do much better in the kind of intense work groups that you will
participate in today.
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Researchers have developed several tests to determine who will be especially good at
working in the kind close-knit groups that you will join later today. You will take one of
these tests before joining your group.

Relative pay is another factor in how well groups perform. When a group feels that some
members are overpaid, intense resentment builds up and group performance suffers. To
try to optimize group performance we use your score on the aptitude tests to place you in
a job. The different jobs available and how much each position pays is shown below.
Your pay is determined by whether you are right-handed or left-handed and your score on
the aptitude tests.

Ordinarily, everyone would get paid the same amount of money for participation.
However, due to the tough economic times, we had to cut pay. We cut pay based on
which job you hold during the group work. We do this because your job tells us how high
you scored on the aptitude test and whether or not you are right-handed or left-handed.
The job that requires the highest aptitude will not receive a pay cut. All other jobs will
receive pay cuts as detailed below:
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As you can see from the chart, your pay cut is determined by whether you are righthanded or left-handed, and by your score on the aptitude tests.

On rare occasions, right-handers with very high aptitude score are made Psychotherapist.
However, we try to avoid this because of the extreme negative reactions that other group
members sometimes have toward a right-handed leader. Right-handed Technicians are
also resented but not as much as right-handed Psychotherapists.

Each group has one Psychotherapist, two Technicians, and three Orderlies. If you are
chosen to be the Psychotherapist, you will receive the smallest pay cut of $0. Technicians
will receive a pay cut of $24.50 and Orderlies will receive the largest pay cut of $28.

The job you get and your pay cut today is based on your aptitude for performing the
socially complex task your group faces. We estimate your aptitude from test scores and
whether you are left-handed or right-handed.

To make sure you have a good idea of the job you will be doing and how much of a pay
cut you will receive, the Compensation Table will be shown again. Please study it
carefully.

You will now take the aptitude test. The test that you will take is scientifically designed
and nationally standardized. That means that after you finish the test, the computer will
display a chart that shows you how you compare to other women in the United States.
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You can also see how high you rank in comparison with the people you will work with.
Group performance should be at its peak when group members have jobs that are in line
with their aptitude. When you meet the other members of your group, your aptitude
scores and those of other group members will be posted for all to see and compare.

We have one last thing before you take the test. Sometimes people try to cheat on the
aptitude tests to get a better job or more pay. We take cheating very seriously. Cheaters
will be caught and punished according to the University of South Carolina's honor code.

It is surprisingly easy to catch cheaters. We caught the last group because right-handers
had scored abnormally high on the tests. We looked at the patterns of answers given by
these right-handers and immediately suspected cheating.

Low Status, Rewards
We are investigating the way people come together to form work teams. Today’s work
environments are intensely social. Most people no longer perform their jobs in isolation,
such as on assembly lines. Rather, we usually work more closely with other people who
may be different from us in many respects. Sometimes these differences make working
together difficult; tempers flare and feelings get hurt.

A group has to work together to be successful. But group members normally have
different levels of ability. So as the social interaction of group work becomes more
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intense, the ability to get along with others and coordinate the work of diverse group
members becomes especially difficult.

One factor that we are studying here today is whether group members are right-handed or
left-handed. We want to learn more about how these differences affect work group
performance.

Today you will participate in an intense work group. Each of you will be assigned a job
in a mock mental health treatment center. All of your fellow group members will be
women. Your interactions with the other group members will be observed, videorecorded and coded by trained sociologists.

Before you enter the work group, we would like to tell you more about what previous
studies about right-handed and left-handed workers show.

Previous research has shown that left-handed workers are much better at coordinating
group work and getting things done in groups. In general, left-handers make better
leaders. Social scientists are not exactly sure why left-handers are better at these tasks
than right-handers, although certain psychological processes having to do with the left
and right brain are thought to cause this effect.

In contrast, right-handers are too inflexible and likely to make poor decisions. Righthanders may be so rigid that they cannot lead a group effectively, though they sometimes
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make good followers. For this reason, right-handers in positions of leadership are often
resented by other team members. This further hampers the ability of right-handers to
work in groups. In addition, right-handers are often too subservient.

In general, left-handers do much better in the kind of intense work groups that you will
participate in today.

Researchers have developed several tests to determine who will be especially good at
working in the kind close-knit groups that you will join later today. You will take one of
these tests before joining your group.

Relative pay is another factor in how well groups perform. When a group feels that some
members are overpaid, intense resentment builds up and group performance suffers. To
try to optimize group performance we use your score on the aptitude tests to place you in
a job. The different jobs available and how much each position pays is shown below.
Your pay is determined by whether you are right-handed or left-handed and your score on
the aptitude tests.
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As you can see from the chart, your pay is determined by whether you are right-handed
or left-handed, and by your score on the aptitude tests.

On rare occasions, right-handers with very high aptitude score are made Psychotherapist.
However, we try to avoid this because of the extreme negative reactions that other group
members sometimes have toward a right-handed leader. Right-handed Technicians are
also resented but not as much as right-handed Psychotherapists.

Each group has one Psychotherapist, two Technicians, and three Orderlies. If you are
chosen to be the Psychotherapist, you will be paid the highest amount of $38.
Technicians will be paid $13.50 and Orderlies will receive the lowest pay of $10.

The job you get and your pay today is based on your aptitude for performing the socially
complex task your group faces. We estimate your aptitude from test scores and whether
you are left-handed or right-handed.
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To make sure you have a good idea of the job you will be doing and how much of a pay
you will receive, the Compensation Table will be shown again. Please study it carefully.

You will now take the aptitude test. The test that you will take is scientifically designed
and nationally standardized. That means that after you finish the test, the computer will
display a chart that shows you how you compare to other women in the United States.

You can also see how high you rank in comparison with the people you will work with.
Group performance should be at its peak when group members have jobs that are in line
with their aptitude. When you meet the other members of your group, your aptitude
scores and those of other group members will be posted for all to see and compare.

We have one last thing before you take the test. As a further bonus, the names of high
scoring left-handers will be forwarded to the career center for special recognition. This
kind of recognition is beneficial for job resumes and graduate school applications.

High scoring right-handers will receive an introductory pamphlet from the career center.
While this pamphlet can be beneficial, much further effort will be required on the part of
right-handers to really make a difference.

112

High Status, Costs

We are investigating the way people come together to form work teams. Today’s work
environments are intensely social. Most people no longer perform their jobs in isolation,
such as on assembly lines. Rather, we usually work more closely with other people who
may be different from us in many respects. Sometimes these differences make working
together difficult; tempers flare and feelings get hurt.

A group has to work together to be successful. But group members normally have
different levels of ability. So as the social interaction of group work becomes more
intense, the ability to get along with others and coordinate the work of diverse group
members becomes especially difficult.

One factor that we are studying here today is whether group members are right-handed or
left-handed. We want to learn more about how these differences affect work group
performance.

Today you will participate in an intense work group. Each of you will be assigned a job
in a mock mental health treatment center. All of your fellow group members will be
women. Your interactions with the other group members will be observed, videorecorded and coded by trained sociologists.
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Before you enter the work group, we would like to tell you more about what previous
studies about right-handed and left-handed workers show.

Previous research has shown that right-handed workers are much better at coordinating
group work and getting things done in groups. In general, right-handers make better
leaders. Social scientists are not exactly sure why right-handers are better at these tasks
than left-handers, although certain psychological processes having to do with the left and
right brain are thought to cause this effect.

In contrast, left-handers are too inflexible and likely to make poor decisions. Left-handers
may be so rigid that they cannot lead a group effectively, though they sometimes make
good followers. For this reason, left-handers in positions of leadership are often resented
by other team members. This further hampers the ability of left-handers to work in
groups. In addition, left-handers are often too subservient.

In general, right-handers do much better in the kind of intense work groups that you will
participate in today.

Researchers have developed several tests to determine who will be especially good at
working in the kind close-knit groups that you will join later today. You will take one of
these tests before joining your group.
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Relative pay is another factor in how well groups perform. When a group feels that some
members are overpaid, intense resentment builds up and group performance suffers. To
try to optimize group performance we use your score on the aptitude tests to place you in
a job. The different jobs available and how much each position pays is shown below.
Your pay is determined by whether you are right-handed or left-handed and your score on
the aptitude tests.

Ordinarily, everyone would get paid the same amount of money for participation.
However, due to the tough economic times, we had to cut pay. We cut pay based on
which job you hold during the group work. We do this because your job tells us how high
you scored on the aptitude test and whether or not you are right-handed or left-handed.
The job that requires the highest aptitude will not receive a pay cut. All other jobs will
receive pay cuts as detailed below:

As you can see from the chart, your pay cut is determined by whether you are righthanded or left-handed, and by your score on the aptitude tests.
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On rare occasions, left-handers with very high aptitude score are made Psychotherapist.
However, we try to avoid this because of the extreme negative reactions that other group
members sometimes have toward a left-handed leader. Left-handed Technicians are also
resented but not as much as left-handed Psychotherapists.

Each group has one Psychotherapist, two Technicians, and three Orderlies. If you are
chosen to be the Psychotherapist, you will receive the smallest pay cut of $0. Technicians
will receive a pay cut of $24.50 and Orderlies will receive the largest pay cut of $28.

The job you get and your pay cut today is based on your aptitude for performing the
socially complex task your group faces. We estimate your aptitude from test scores and
whether you are left-handed or right-handed.

To make sure you have a good idea of the job you will be doing and how much of a pay
cut you will receive, the Compensation Table will be shown again. Please study it
carefully.

You will now take the aptitude test. The test that you will take is scientifically designed
and nationally standardized. That means that after you finish the test, the computer will
display a chart that shows you how you compare to other women in the United States.

You can also see how high you rank in comparison with the people you will work with.
Group performance should be at its peak when group members have jobs that are in line
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with their aptitude. When you meet the other members of your group, your aptitude
scores and those of other group members will be posted for all to see and compare.

We have one last thing before you take the test. Sometimes people try to cheat on the
aptitude tests to get a better job or more pay. We take cheating very seriously. Cheaters
will be caught and punished according to the University of South Carolina's honor code.

It is surprisingly easy to catch cheaters. We caught the last group because left-handers
had scored abnormally high on the tests. We looked at the patterns of answers given by
these left-handers and immediately suspected cheating.

High Status, Rewards

We are investigating the way people come together to form work teams. Today’s work
environments are intensely social. Most people no longer perform their jobs in isolation,
such as on assembly lines. Rather, we usually work more closely with other people who
may be different from us in many respects. Sometimes these differences make working
together difficult; tempers flare and feelings get hurt.

A group has to work together to be successful. But group members normally have
different levels of ability. So as the social interaction of group work becomes more
intense, the ability to get along with others and coordinate the work of diverse group
members becomes especially difficult.
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One factor that we are studying here today is whether group members are right-handed or
left-handed. We want to learn more about how these differences affect work group
performance.

Today you will participate in an intense work group. Each of you will be assigned a job
in a mock mental health treatment center. All of your fellow group members will be
women. Your interactions with the other group members will be observed, videorecorded and coded by trained sociologists.

Before you enter the work group, we would like to tell you more about what previous
studies about right-handed and left-handed workers show.

Previous research has shown that right-handed workers are much better at coordinating
group work and getting things done in groups. In general, right-handers make better
leaders. Social scientists are not exactly sure why right-handers are better at these tasks
than left-handers, although certain psychological processes having to do with the left and
right brain are thought to cause this effect.

In contrast, left-handers are too inflexible and likely to make poor decisions. Left-handers
may be so rigid that they cannot lead a group effectively, though they sometimes make
good followers. For this reason, left-handers in positions of leadership are often resented
by other team members. This further hampers the ability of left-handers to work in
groups. In addition, left-handers are often too subservient.
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In general, right-handers do much better in the kind of intense work groups that you will
participate in today.

Researchers have developed several tests to determine who will be especially good at
working in the kind close-knit groups that you will join later today. You will take one of
these tests before joining your group.

Relative pay is another factor in how well groups perform. When a group feels that some
members are overpaid, intense resentment builds up and group performance suffers. To
try to optimize group performance we use your score on the aptitude tests to place you in
a job. The different jobs available and how much each position pays is shown below.
Your pay is determined by whether you are right-handed or left-handed and your score on
the aptitude tests.
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As you can see from the chart, your pay is determined by whether you are right-handed
or left-handed, and by your score on the aptitude tests.

On rare occasions, left-handers with very high aptitude score are made Psychotherapist.
However, we try to avoid this because of the extreme negative reactions that other group
members sometimes have toward a left-handed leader. Left-handed Technicians are also
resented but not as much as left-handed Psychotherapists.

Each group has one Psychotherapist, two Technicians, and three Orderlies. If you are
chosen to be the Psychotherapist, you will be paid the highest amount of $38.
Technicians will be paid $13.50 and Orderlies will receive the lowest pay of $10.

The job you get and your pay today is based on your aptitude for performing the socially
complex task your group faces. We estimate your aptitude from test scores and whether
you are left-handed or right-handed.

To make sure you have a good idea of the job you will be doing and how much of a pay
you will receive, the Compensation Table will be shown again. Please study it carefully.

You will now take the aptitude test. The test that you will take is scientifically designed
and nationally standardized. That means that after you finish the test, the computer will
display a chart that shows you how you compare to other women in the United States.
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You can also see how high you rank in comparison with the people you will work with.
Group performance should be at its peak when group members have jobs that are in line
with their aptitude. When you meet the other members of your group, your aptitude
scores and those of other group members will be posted for all to see and compare.

We have one last thing before you take the test. As a further bonus, the names of high
scoring right-handers will be forwarded to the career center for special recognition. This
kind of recognition is beneficial for job resumes and graduate school applications.

High scoring left-handers will receive an introductory pamphlet from the career center.
While this pamphlet can be beneficial, much further effort will be required on the part of
left-handers to really make a difference.
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APPENDIX C: EFFORT, TEST IMPORTANCE, AND MOTIVATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Student Opinion Scale
Please think about the test that you just completed. Mark the answer that best represents
how you feel about each of the statements below.

1. Doing well on this test was important to me.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

2. I engaged in good effort throughout this test.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

3. I am not curious about how I did on this test relative to others.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

4. I am not concerned about the score I receive on this test.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7
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5. This was an important test to me.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

6. I gave my best effort on this test.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

7. While taking this test, I could have worked harder on it.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

8. I would like to know how well I did on this test.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

9. I did not give this test my full attention while completing it.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7

10. While taking this test, I was able to persist to completion of the task.
Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF A RAVEN’S TEST QUESTION
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APPENDIX E: POWER ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE SAMPLE SIZE
All figures are taken from Lovaglia et al. (1998), studies 1-3. Let
∑∝

∅ =

∝=

= 2.

−

Using Feldt power charts, sample size is listed for power of .5, .7, and .9 at both the .05
and .01 levels of significance. We analyzed all three of Lovaglia et al.’s (1998) studies
because they all manipulate status and measure intelligence (see Tables E.1-E.4).
However, we focus our attention on Study 3 because it most closely resembles the current
study (both use only women). Feldt power analysis shows that we need from 14-47
participants per cell to expect to have enough power to detect differences between
conditions. Taking into consideration that the magnitude of our manipulation is less than
that of Lovaglia et al. (1998), we chose to run 38 participants in each condition.

Study One
Table E.1. Descriptive Statistics of Lovaglia et al. (1998): Study One.

Condition One
Condition Two

Mean
55.63
53.91

SD
3.03
3.60

Study Means

54.77

3.32
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55.63 – 54.77 = .86
53.91 – 54.77 = -.86

∅ =

∑ .

.

.

∅ =

∑ .

.

.

.!

∅ =

.

∅ = .2594

∅ = √. 0673

Table E.2. Sample Size Per Cell as Determined by Feldt Power Charts.

Significance
level

Power threshold
.7
52
78

.5
33
55

.05
.01

.9
87
>100

Study Two

Table E.3. Descriptive Statistics of Lovaglia et al. (1998): Study Two.

Condition One
Condition Two

Mean
56.20
54.00

SD
2.88
3.58

Study Means

55.10

3.23

55.63 – 54.77 = .86
53.91 – 54.77 = -.86

∅ =

∑ .

.

.

∅ =

∑ .

.!

.

∅ =

∅ = .3406
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*

∅ = √. 1160

Table E.4. Sample Size Per Cell as Determined by Feldt Power Charts.

Significance
level

Power threshold
.7
28
44

.5
18
31

.05
.01

.9
46
65

Study Three

Table E.5. Descriptive Statistics of Lovaglia et al. (1998): Study Three.

Condition One
Condition Two

Mean
54.95
52.35

SD
2.93
3.39

Study Means

53.65

3.16

54.95 - 53.65 = 1.3
52.35 - 53.65 = -1.3

∅ =

∑ .

.

.

∅ =

∑ .

.

.

∅ =

∅ = .4113

.

.

∅ = √. 1692

Table E.6. Sample Size Per Cell as Determined by Feldt Power Charts.

Significance
level

.05
.01

Power threshold
.7
19
31

.5
14
23

127

.9
33
47

APPENDIX F: F-TEST OF NESTED MODELS CALCULATIONS: STUDY ONE
Calculation of the F statistic to compare the full model with the reduced model.
--. /0 1234523 6/327 − --. /0 0477 6/327
# /0 5/9:;1 <923 = 1 62;21:
,=
-. /0 0477 6/327
1996.074 − 1990.727
2
,=
14.531
, = .184

Calculation of the df for the F statistic.
30 = ?, 9 − = /0 0477 6/327
30 = 2, 144 − 7
30 = 2, 137

Final result.
,

,

= .184, = = .832.
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APPENDIX G: IDENTITY QUESTIONNAIRE
Post Study Questionnaire

Instructions: Under each statement, circle the number that best describes how you feel.
Use the scale below to respond to each statement.

1. I see myself as a University of South Carolina student.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

2. I am pleased to be a University of South Carolina student.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

3. I feel strong ties with other University of South Carolina students.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

4. I identify with other University of South Carolina students.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9
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5. Which of the following diagrams best represents how you perceive your relationship to
your university. Please circle the picture which best describes your relationship.

Self

University

Self

Self

University

University

Self

Self University

University

Self

University

Self University

6. I think that I did well on the test.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

7. I expect to do well at the group task.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

8. I expect to get along with my group.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

9. I expect that my group will approve of my test score.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9
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APPENDIX H: STUDY TWO: SCRIPTS
In-Group Costs

We are investigating the way people come together to form work teams. Today’s work
environments are intensely social. Most people no longer perform their jobs in isolation,
such as on assembly lines. Rather, we usually work more closely with other people who
may be different from us in many respects. Sometimes these differences make working
together difficult; tempers flare and feelings get hurt.

A group has to work together to be successful. But group members normally have
different levels of ability. So as the social interaction of group work becomes more
intense, the ability to get along with others and coordinate the work of diverse group
members becomes especially difficult.

One factor that we are studying here today is college affiliation. We want to learn more
about how people perform in groups together when they attend either the same or
different universities.

Today you will participate in an intense work group. Each of you will be assigned a job
in a mock mental health treatment center. All of your fellow group members will be
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women. Your interactions with the other group members will be observed, videorecorded and coded by trained sociologists.

This is what you can expect from today's study:

1) You will be assigned to work with either University of South Carolina students or
Clemson University students;

2) You will be told how your pay for the study will be calculated;

3) You will take a groupwork aptitude test; and

4) You will participate in a group task with other women from either the University of
South Carolina or Clemson University.

As a reminder, please make sure to fill out the questions on the sheet in front of you when
prompted by the computer.

Please answer the following questions using the choices below.

I attend college at:
The University of South Carolina
Clemson University
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Please answer the following questions using the scale below.

How much do you like being a student at the University of South Carolina?

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

In 20 characters or more, please explain why you chose to attend the University of South
Carolina over Clemson University.

According to research, people who attend the same university are likely to be more
similar to one another than they might expect. These similarities include several
dimensions, such as worldview, values, attitudes and behaviors.

This means that those who also attend the University of South Carolina may be more
similar to you than those who attend Clemson University.

We do not know all of the reasons why those who attend the same college tend to be
more similar to one another than those who attend different colleges, but we do know that
this similarity exists and has been shown in many other research studies. One of the goals
of today's study is to find out more about this.
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I see myself as a University of South Carolina student.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I am pleased to be a University of South Carolina student.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I feel strong ties with other University of South Carolina students.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I identify with other University of South Carolina students.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

Which of the following diagrams best represents how you perceive your relationship to
your university. Please circle the picture which best describes your relationship.

Self

University

Self

University

Self

University

Self

Self University
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University

Self University

Self

University

One of the goals of today’s research is to examine how similarities in college affiliation
affects work group performance. For this reason, in the second part of the study, you will
be assigned to work with students from the University of South Carolina.

Please answer Question #2 on your sheet.

We would like to tell you more about what previous studies about the students at the
University of South Carolina and Clemson University show. Previous research has shown
that Clemson University students are much better at coordinating group work and getting
things done in groups. This means that, in general, Clemson University students make
better group leaders.

Social scientists are not exactly sure why Clemson University students are better at group
work than the University of South Carolina students. It could be because Clemson
University is ranked almost 50 spots higher than the University of South Carolina in US
News and World Report’s national college rankings. Clemson University students might
also be better at group work because they have a record of hiring faculty from more
prestigious universities, such as Harvard University. Additionally, Clemson University
offers courses that are geared specifically at improving their students’ ability to
participate in groups.

In contrast to Clemson University students, the University of South Carolina students are
too inflexible during group work and are likely to make poor decisions as leaders. The
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University of South Carolina students may be so rigid that they cannot lead a group
effectively, though they sometimes make good followers. Because of the University of
South Carolina’s students’ low ability to work in groups, we have found that during
group studies run in our laboratory, University of South Carolina students that are in
positions of leadership are often resented by the others in the group. This further hampers
the ability of the group to succeed. In addition, the University of South Carolina students
are often too subservient during group work.

In general, Clemson University students do much better in the kind of intense work
groups that you will participate in today. Clemson University seems to prepare students
better for group work.

Researchers have developed several tests to determine who will be especially good at
working in the kind of close-knit groups that you will join later today. You will take one
of these tests before joining University of South Carolina students for the group work.

Please answer Question #3 on your worksheet.

Relative pay is another factor in how well groups perform. When a group feels that some
members are overpaid, intense resentment builds up and group performance suffers. To
try to optimize group performance, we ran a previous study to determine the best way to
pay you for your participation in this study. In this previous study, we asked University
of South Carolina students or Clemson University students to rate pay charts. We asked
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them to select the chart that they thought should be used to calculate your pay for the
study.

University of South Carolina students decided that your pay should be determined by
your college affiliation and by your score on the aptitude test. The different jobs available
and how much each position pays is shown below.

Again, your pay is determined by whether you are a University of South Carolina student
or a Clemson University student and your score on the aptitude test. Students at the
University of South Carolina selected the following pay chart for you.

Ordinarily, everyone would get paid the same amount of money for participation.
However, due to the tough economic times, University of South Carolina students
decided to cut pay. They cut pay based on which job you hold during the group work.
They did this because your job is based on how high you scored on the aptitude test and
whether or not you attend the University of South Carolina or Clemson University. The
job that requires the highest aptitude will not receive a pay cut. All other jobs will receive
pay cuts as detailed below:
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As you can see from the chart, University of South Carolina students thought that your
pay cut should be determined by what college you attend and by your score on the
aptitude tests.

According to University of South Carolina students, on rare occasions, University of
South Carolina students with very high aptitude score can be made Psychotherapist.
However, University of South Carolina students wanted to try to avoid this because of the
extreme negative reactions that other University of South Carolina students sometimes
have toward a University of South Carolina group leader. They thought that University of
South Carolina students with the Technician job would also be resented but not as much
as University of South Carolina students with the Psychotherapist job.

Each group has one Psychotherapist, two Technicians, and three Orderlies. If you are
chosen to be the Psychotherapist, University of South Carolina students determined that
you will receive the smallest pay cut of $0. Technicians will receive a pay cut of $24.50
and Orderlies will receive the largest pay cut of $28.
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The job you get and your pay cut today is based on what college you go to and your
aptitude for performing the socially complex task your group faces. University of South
Carolina students decided that we will calculate your pay based on your aptitude from
test scores and whether you attend the University of South Carolina or Clemson
University.

To make sure you have a good idea of the job you will be doing and how much of a pay
cut you will receive, the Compensation Table will be shown again. Please study it
carefully and answer Question #4 on your worksheet.

You will now take the aptitude test. The test that you will take is scientifically designed
and nationally standardized. That means that after you finish the test, the computer will
display a chart that shows you how you compare to other women in the United States.

After you complete the aptitude test, you will be working with students from the
University of South Carolina. You will also be able to see how high you rank in
comparison with University of South Carolina students. Group performance should be at
its peak when group members have jobs that are in line with their aptitude. When you
meet the other members of the work group, your aptitude scores and those of other group
members will be posted for all to see and compare.
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We have one last thing before you take the test. Sometimes people try to cheat on the
aptitude tests to get a better job or more pay. We take cheating very seriously. Cheaters
will be caught and punished according to the University of South Carolina's honor code.

It is surprisingly easy to catch cheaters. We caught the last group because University of
South Carolina students had scored abnormally high on the tests. We looked at the
patterns of answers given by these University of South Carolina students and
immediately suspected cheating.

I think that I did well on the test.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I expect to do well at the group task.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I expect to get along with my group.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I expect that my group will approve of my test score.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much
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Out-Group Costs

We are investigating the way people come together to form work teams. Today’s work
environments are intensely social. Most people no longer perform their jobs in isolation,
such as on assembly lines. Rather, we usually work more closely with other people who
may be different from us in many respects. Sometimes these differences make working
together difficult; tempers flare and feelings get hurt.

A group has to work together to be successful. But group members normally have
different levels of ability. So as the social interaction of group work becomes more
intense, the ability to get along with others and coordinate the work of diverse group
members becomes especially difficult.

One factor that we are studying here today is college affiliation. We want to learn more
about how people perform in groups together when they attend either the same or
different universities.

Today you will participate in an intense work group. Each of you will be assigned a job
in a mock mental health treatment center. All of your fellow group members will be
women. Your interactions with the other group members will be observed, videorecorded and coded by trained sociologists.

141

This is what you can expect from today's study:

1) You will be assigned to work with either University of South Carolina students or
Clemson University students;

2) You will be told how your pay for the study will be calculated;

3) You will take a groupwork aptitude test; and

4) You will participate in a group task with other women from either the University of
South Carolina or Clemson University.

As a reminder, please make sure to fill out the questions on the sheet in front of you when
prompted by the computer.

Please answer the following questions using the choices below.

I attend college at:
The University of South Carolina
Clemson University

Please answer the following questions using the scale below.
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How much do you like being a student at the University of South Carolina?

1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

In 20 characters or more, please explain why you chose to attend the University of South
Carolina over Clemson University.

According to research, people who attend the same university are likely to be more
similar to one another than they might expect. These similarities include several
dimensions, such as worldview, values, attitudes and behaviors.

This means that those who also attend the University of South Carolina may be more
similar to you than those who attend Clemson University.

We do not know all of the reasons why those who attend the same college tend to be
more similar to one another than those who attend different colleges, but we do know that
this similarity exists and has been shown in many other research studies. One of the goals
of today's study is to find out more about this.

I see myself as a University of South Carolina student.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much
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I am pleased to be a University of South Carolina student.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I feel strong ties with other University of South Carolina students.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I identify with other University of South Carolina students.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

Which of the following diagrams best represents how you perceive your relationship to
your university. Please circle the picture which best describes your relationship.

Self

University

Self University

Self

University

Self

Self University

University

Self

University

Self University

One of the goals of today’s research is to examine how similarities in college affiliation
affects work group performance. For this reason, in the second part of the study, you will
be assigned to work with students from the University of South Carolina.
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Please answer Question #2 on your sheet.

We would like to tell you more about what previous studies about the students at the
University of South Carolina and Clemson University show. Previous research has shown
that Clemson University students are much better at coordinating group work and getting
things done in groups. This means that, in general, Clemson University students make
better group leaders.

Social scientists are not exactly sure why Clemson University students are better at group
work than the University of South Carolina students. It could be because Clemson
University is ranked almost 50 spots higher than the University of South Carolina in US
News and World Report’s national college rankings. Clemson University students might
also be better at group work because they have a record of hiring faculty from more
prestigious universities, such as Harvard University. Additionally, Clemson University
offers courses that are geared specifically at improving their students’ ability to
participate in groups.

In contrast to Clemson University students, the University of South Carolina students are
too inflexible during group work and are likely to make poor decisions as leaders. The
University of South Carolina students may be so rigid that they cannot lead a group
effectively, though they sometimes make good followers. Because of the University of
South Carolina’s students’ low ability to work in groups, we have found that during
group studies run in our laboratory, University of South Carolina students that are in
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positions of leadership are often resented by the others in the group. This further hampers
the ability of the group to succeed. In addition, the University of South Carolina students
are often too subservient during group work.

In general, Clemson University students do much better in the kind of intense work
groups that you will participate in today. Clemson University seems to prepare students
better for group work.

Researchers have developed several tests to determine who will be especially good at
working in the kind of close-knit groups that you will join later today. You will take one
of these tests before joining Clemson University students for the group work.

Please answer Question #3 on your worksheet.

Relative pay is another factor in how well groups perform. When a group feels that some
members are overpaid, intense resentment builds up and group performance suffers. To
try to optimize group performance, we ran a previous study to determine the best way to
pay you for your participation in this study. In this previous study, we asked University
of South Carolina students or Clemson University students to rate pay charts. We asked
them to select the chart that they thought should be used to calculate your pay for the
study.

146

Clemson University students decided that your pay should be determined by your college
affiliation and by your score on the aptitude test. The different jobs available and how
much each position pays is shown below.

Again, your pay is determined by whether you are a University of South Carolina student
or a Clemson University student and your score on the aptitude test. Students at Clemson
University selected the following pay chart for you.

Ordinarily, everyone would get paid the same amount of money for participation.
However, due to the tough economic times, University of South Carolina students
decided to cut pay. They cut pay based on which job you hold during the group work.
They did this because your job is based on how high you scored on the aptitude test and
whether or not you attend the University of South Carolina or Clemson University. The
job that requires the highest aptitude will not receive a pay cut. All other jobs will receive
pay cuts as detailed below:
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As you can see from the chart, Clemson University students thought that your pay cut
should be determined by what college you attend and by your score on the aptitude tests.

According to Clemson University students, on rare occasions, University of South
Carolina students with very high aptitude score can be made Psychotherapist. However,
Clemson University students wanted to try to avoid this because of the extreme negative
reactions that other Clemson University students sometimes have toward a University of
South Carolina group leader. They thought that University of South Carolina students
with the Technician job would also be resented but not as much as University of South
Carolina students with the Psychotherapist job.

Each group has one Psychotherapist, two Technicians, and three Orderlies. If you are
chosen to be the Psychotherapist, Clemson University students determined that you will
receive the smallest pay cut of $0. Technicians will receive a pay cut of $24.50 and
Orderlies will receive the largest pay cut of $28.

The job you get and your pay cut today is based on what college you go to and your
aptitude for performing the socially complex task your group faces. Clemson University
students decided that we will calculate your pay based on your aptitude from test scores
and whether you attend the University of South Carolina or Clemson University.
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To make sure you have a good idea of the job you will be doing and how much of a pay
cut you will receive, the Compensation Table will be shown again. Please study it
carefully and answer Question #4 on your worksheet.

You will now take the aptitude test. The test that you will take is scientifically designed
and nationally standardized. That means that after you finish the test, the computer will
display a chart that shows you how you compare to other women in the United States.

After you complete the aptitude test, you will be working with students from Clemson
University. You will also be able to see how high you rank in comparison with Clemson
University students. Group performance should be at its peak when group members have
jobs that are in line with their aptitude. When you meet the other members of the work
group, your aptitude scores and those of other group members will be posted for all to see
and compare.

We have one last thing before you take the test. Sometimes people try to cheat on the
aptitude tests to get a better job or more pay. We take cheating very seriously. Cheaters
will be caught and punished according to the University of South Carolina's honor code.

It is surprisingly easy to catch cheaters. We caught the last group because University of
South Carolina students had scored abnormally high on the tests. We looked at the
patterns of answers given by these University of South Carolina students and
immediately suspected cheating.
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I think that I did well on the test.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I expect to do well at the group task.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I expect to get along with my group.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much

I expect that my group will approve of my test score.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7-----------------8-----------------9

Not at all

Very Much
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APPENDIX I: F-TEST OF NESTED MODELS: STUDY TWO
Calculation of F statistic to compare Model 1 with Model 2.
--. /0 1234523 6/327 − --. /0 0477 6/327
# /0 5/9:;1 <923 = 1 62;21:
,=
-. /0 0477 6/327
432.391 − 411.904
4
,=
16.476
, = 0.311

Calculation of the df for the F statistic.
30 = ?, 9 − = /0 0477 6/327
30 = 4, 34 − 9
30 = 4, 25

Final result.
, !,

*

= .311, = = .868
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Calculation of F statistic to compare Model 2 with Model 3
--. /0 1234523 6/327 − --. /0 0477 6/327
# /0 5/9:;1 <923 = 1 62;21:
,=
-. /0 0477 6/327
459.48 − 432.391
1
,=
14.91
, = 1.817

Calculation of the df for the F statistic.
30 = ?, 9 − = /0 0477 6/327
30 = 1, 34 − 5
30 = 1, 29

Final result.
, !,

*

= 1.817, = = 0.188
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APPENDIX J: SIMULATION R CODE

Setting a seed ensures that results can be replicated:
set.seed(102)
The “rnorm” command takes draws off of a normal distribution based on the first
two moments of the distribution. We take 20,000 draws off of the distribution of M and
Q.
a<-rnorm(20000,mean=.621694,sd=.061694)
b<-rnorm(20000,mean=.101896,sd=.045476)
We then multiply Q times the expectation advantage of P over O:
b2<-b*.9899
We then “column bind” and sum M and Q(ep – eo) to generate predicted P(s)
values:
c<-cbind(a,b2)
d<-rowSums(c)
d<-sort(d)
Finally, we repeat these steps for O:
a5<-rnorm(20000,mean=.621694,sd=.061694)
b5<-rnorm(20000,mean=.101896,sd=.045476)
b6<-b*-.9899
c5<-cbind(a,b6)
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d5<-rowSums(c5)
d5<-sort(d5).
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APPENDIX K: CALCULATIONS FOR EXPECTATION ADVANTAGES

Path lengths for P
f(3), f(4)

Path lengths for O
f(-3), f(-4)

Path weights taken from Balkwell (1991)

f (1…n) = [1-(1-f(i))… [1-(1-f(n)]
e+p= 1- (1-f(3)) (1-f(4))
e+p = (1-.4056) (1-.1504)
e+p = (.5944) (.8496)
e+p = .495

e-p= 0

ep = e+ - eep = .495 – 0
ep - .495
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Expectation advantage for P

Expectation advantage for O

E = ep - eo
E = .495 - -.495
E = .99

E = eo – ep
E = -.495 - .495
E = -.99

P(s) for P

P(s) for O

P(s) = m + q(E)
P(s) = .6284 + .0985 (.99)
P(s) = .6284 + .097515
P(s) = .725915

P(s) = m + q(E)
P(s) = .6284 + .0985 (-.99)
P(s) = .6284 - .097515
P(s) = .530885
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